The Organism as the Judgment of God: Aristotle, Kant and Deleuze on Nature (that is, on biology, theology and politics)

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God has been called many things, but perhaps nothing so strange as the name of “lobster” which he receives in A Thousand Plateaus. Is this simple profanation a pendant to the gleeful anti-clericalism of Deleuze, for whom there is no insult so wretched as that of “priest”? Certainly, on one level. But it is also a clue to Deleuze’s ability to use a traditional concern of theology, the name of God, to intervene in the most basic questions of Western philosophy, in this case, the interchange of theology, biology and politics inherent in the question of nature and the organism.

The unity and finality of nature as a whole and the organism as microcosm have always been patterned on God. Deleuze acknowledges this tradition in his concept “the organism as the judgment of God” (ATP, p. 159), and then breaks with it with the concept of “God is a lobster”. This essay will explain how the first of these concepts, “the organism as the judgment of God”, demonstrates a fundamental structure in one stream of Western philosophy, as exemplified in Aristotle and Kant, while the second, “God is a lobster”, shows Deleuze’s radical break with this traditional nexus of theology, biology and politics.

Why Aristotle and Kant? Why not Plato and Hegel? Or any other pair of great canonical figures whose linkage of theology, biology and politics was equally thoughtful and influential? Precisely because the very arbitrariness of the pairing will demonstrate
the solidity of the theo-bio-political structure expressed by the concept “the organism and the judgment of God” and thus the utility of Deleuze’s insightful formulation of it. I cannot demonstrate it here, but I am confident that a reading of the Timaeus and the Encyclopedia could demonstrate that, for Plato and Hegel as well, the organism is the judgment of God. So showing that two philosophers as disparate in time, method and cultural presuppositions as Aristotle and Kant share a profound similarity in the way God provides the model of the organism, demonstrates that structure in a way that a simple point of reference, say Aristotle alone, would not.

The concept of “the organism as the judgment of God” could only have come from the wild syncretism of Deleuze and Guattari, who gleefully bring the rantings of Artaud to bear on the deepest questions of Western philosophy. The key for understanding how the organism is the judgment of God for Aristotle, Kant and Deleuze is to unearth the connections in their thought of biology, theology and politics. In a word, to think nature. But nature in conceived differently in the three thinkers, and thus so will God be, for the question of God is inextricably linked to the question of nature. For Aristotle, nature is unidirectional: it is oriented to the best, to self direction, autarkeia. Deviation from this natural striving for self-direction is unnatural: it is monstrosity, femininity, slavishness. Thus for Aristotle, the god, the most perfectly realized instance of self-direction, in the prime mover of cosmic locomotion and its lesser analogue, species reproduction, and is also the model for organismic unity. For Kant, nature is the field in which mechanism and purposiveness must be reconciled via the thought of an architect God. For Kant, God is the architect whom we must presuppose to understand the self-organizing unity of part and whole in nature and in the organism. For Deleuze,
nature is the abstract machine of stratification and destratification, or, in another formulation, coding/overcoding/decoding. There is a double direction to Deleuzean nature, towards unity and towards dispersion, towards capture and towards escape. For Deleuze, however, God is a lobster, the double-pincered abstract machine of natural stratification, and thus part, but only part, of nature. It is precisely this restriction of God to a part of nature that constitutes Deleuze’s break with the tradition represented in the essay by Aristotle and Kant, and that enables his critical stance (in the technical sense of critique as separation of the discourse of production from the discourse of products) towards the theo-bio-politics of the organism as judgment of God.

The most important questions are at stake in the question of nature as the interchange of biology, theology and politics. Are natural theology and theologically modelled nature hidden forms of politics? Does Aristotle project the ideal of the adult citizen male onto a nature—onto a biology and theology—that he will then claim justifies his political decision to favor the interests of adult citizen males? Is mechanistic nature for Kant the projection of alienating modern industrial production, and political and moral freedom as self-determining organic unity a reactive bourgeois fantasy? A good case can be made for each of these points, but the defenders of the interests of the state and of capital are such that this “dialogue” would be fruitlessly unending. But, on another level, investigating just how this interchange of biology, theology and politics in nature works brings us to the very cutting edge of contemporary philosophy, the question of complex systems, in ways that vitiate the sterile oppositions of what passes for contemporary political discourse.
With the question of discourse, we come to the question of the logos underlying this theology and biology. For Aristotle and for Kant, the key to the conceptual interchange in the term “nature” is analogy. For Aristotle, nature is the universal pull to realizing the good as the internal telos of things, and the unidirectional orientations to self-direction in biology, theology and the political are analogous to one another. For Kant, owing to the acknowledged limits of his conceptual system, natural organicism is an “analogue of life”, posing questions that can, in lieu of an unthinkable thought of living matter, only to be answered by the supplement of an architect God.

For Deleuze, on the other hand, there is no analogy in nature, but a single dual-action abstract machine operating in, between, and beyond different strata. There is thus no room for metaphor in Deleuze; there is no privilege given to the order of discovery and the cultural sedimentation of signification over the order of being. Crossing these orders is the condition of metaphor. That is, one discovers an analogy between concepts in the sensible order that were indicated by an older sedimentation of signs (the proper signification) and concepts in the intelligible order (the figurative meaning), and then effects a transfer between sensible propriety and intelligible figuration. Rather than metaphor, for Deleuze, there is only the simultaneity of the abstract machine and the multiplicity of machinic assemblages that work on, in, and between strata.

**Aristotle**

David Balme and Pierre Pellegrin, those who have done the most to rehabilitate Aristotle’s biology in the last forty years, rescuing it from those who would denigrate it as a confused grab-bag of empirical observation and fantastic gullibility, insist on the
unity of Aristotle’s thought, that is that one can see the interchange between the natural science writings and the logical/metaphysical writings. They neglect, however, the ethical/political thought and its relation both to biology and to the highest point of “first philosophy”, theology. We must correct this omission and think through the reasons why Aristotle will say that autarkeia is the condition of both the adult citizen male and of “the god”, ho theos, the prime mover. The unity of theo-bio-political thought.

As the theology of Metaphysics, Lambda 7-9 teaches us, the highest being is pure activity, pure being-at-work, energeia. This work or function, ergon, has nothing of externally directed labour about it; it is purely self-directed and purely self-oriented, insight into insight, hé noësis noësos noësis (Metaphysics 12.9.1074b34)6. In fact, the very activity of insight is itself life, hé gar nou energeia zôê (12.7.107b27), and furthermore, this purely interior activity of insight into insight is a life of pure constant pleasure (1072b24-26). The god who enjoys such a life is the highest substance, ousia; it is not merely unified, but simple (1072a32). Divine biology.

We learn from the same passage that god serves as the erotic spur of cosmic locomotion and biological reproduction, kinei hôs erômenon (1072b3). Stars desire the simplicity of life of the god, but can only move in circles, the perfect motion. As such they must settle for mere unity rather than simplicity, as they contain a matter susceptible of locomotion. Divine life is the first-move, erotically provoking the circles of stellar locomotion and species-generation, which mimetically supplement, in their motion and generation, the unreachable constancy of divine life. (De Anima 2.4.415a25-b7; Metaphysics 9.8.1050b28). Erotic mimetology.
Generation is change within the protective borders of the circle of the species, oriented to the ideal case in which the superior male principle, working in the spermatic motions of the father that victoriously overcome the motions inherent in the maternal material on which it works provokes the appearance of the same form in a father-resembling male child (On the Generation of Animals 4.3.767b15-17). Patriarchal semenology.

We have a prephilosophical intuition that men and higher animals are substances, ousiai. The search for ousia in the great central books of the Metaphysics 7-9 is the search for a schema that will reveal the substantiality of those things our prephilosophical intuition has named as ousiai. Dialectical ousiology.

“Substance” is a misnomer for ousia. An ousia is a thing, but also the thinghood of the thing, to ti estin kai tode ti (Metaphysics 7.1.1028a12). First subject, then matter, and most difficultly, form, are disposed of as candidates for ousia. Matter is the unlimited, the indeterminate, hylê. Form, morphê or eidos, is limit, peras. Formation is selection from a pool of potentials, cutting off some functions while selecting others. Eidetic selection entails hylomorphic limitation.

The stumbling block in the identification of ousia is always the question of particular unity. Matter is indeterminate; form is general. The hylomorphic composite enjoys a good run, but questions remain as to the ground of the vertical unity of the hylomorph and horizontal unity of generation. Hylomorphism, the imposition of form on matter, must be supplemented by the functionalising of potential, dynamis, in a unity wholly devoted to an activity, energeia. After the travails of the ousiology, the successful candidate for this thinghood, the substantiality, is activity: hóstê phaneron hoti hè ousia
kai to eidos energeia estin (9.8.1050b1). Activity is not motion; it is self-directed, praxis, not poiesis, practice, not production. Ousia is not static; it is active and powerful, the ability to rule over parts, to form a unity of heterogeneous materials. Substance is not stasis, nor is it motion; it is self-directed activity. Energetic dynamism entails energetic unification.

The soul is the principle of energetic unity in living creatures. Bodily fatigue prevents it from being pure activity. Rather, it is hexis, the capability of a body to perform its characteristic functions (De Anima 2.1.412a27). Under the rule of the soul, the body becomes unified, a single organ, panta gar ta physika sómata tês psychês organa (2.4.415b18). Any formation of a unity is always that of ruler/ruled, and the unification of the animal body under the rule of soul is masterly rather than political (Politics 1.5.1254a30). Psychic organisation entails somatic enslavement.

The ergon of humans, our particular activity, is living the life in which the soul works with excellent reason (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1098a13-16). If the human body is to be an organ for the soul working with logos, it must be prepared so this potential is selected and cultivated. Such preparation of the body is the ethical training of the appetites to display a body that is self-directed: slaves lack decision-making ability, while in women it is not strong enough to rule the appetites, and in [male] children it is incomplete (Politics 1.3.1260a10). Education is the selection and consolidation of self-directing traits in citizen male children. Pedagogic masculinisation.

Politics is the science of arranging the city so the citizens can live well. The character of the citizens is the most important task of the legislator (Politics 8.1.1337a10). He must form the bodies of the male children of citizens so they can
reproduce the model of their fathers. The most self-directed of all citizens is the theoretician (Nicomachean Ethics 10.7.1177a28). Politics is the necessary supplement to safeguard the production of all leisure necessary for theory. Although the most self-directed of all humans, the theoretician needs a leisured body (not a lazy one, as our slavish notion would have it, but a fit and healthy body, an organic body achieved via a balance of exercise, food, rest) (10.8.1178b35). The leisured body of the theoretician is organised to that it can become effaced before the object of nous, its enslaved appetites complacent and quiet. The model of a self-directed living being whose life is theory is the god. The organism as judgment of God.

Kant

Kant brings into transcendental subjectivity the categories of Aristotelian logos, categories that were both, and thus neither, subjective and objective. In the Critique of Judgment he subjectivises the concept of natural purpose or organism, the ousia which Aristotle located in those natural things that had their principle of motion within them, that is, those with an internal final cause and thus those pulled along to be themselves, to make their matter match their form, which their paternal efficient cause passed on by organising maternal material. Now, since, grosso modo, the science of Kant’s time outlawed final cause and had only a billiard ball notion of efficient causality, a mechanism or blind pushing is all Kant could think in nature, given the tools of his time. Nonetheless, he wants to save natural purposes, but without paying the price of naïve realism. His solution: natural purposes can only be thought in the mode of postulates. Think as if nature were purposive.
The *Critique of Judgment* is Kant’s masterpiece, even if he cannot follow through on all the promise of its radicality. In it, he attempts to mediate theory and practice, nature and freedom. The subject of the *Critique of Judgment* is no longer the merely theoretical knower of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, nor the rational moral agent of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, but a natural and embodied subject throughout whom surges a “feeling of life”, *Lebensgefühl*, the raising and lowering of the intensity of which is felt as pleasure and pain. The felt intensity of life.

Such pleasures and pains are brought forth by reflective judgment, which, in contrast to determinate judgment, does not subsume a sensory manifold under a pre-given concept, but instead arrives at its judgment, its way of making sense, in the very process of exploring the manifold given it (*CJ* 190). In other words, reflective judgment is the escape from stereotyped cultural categories; it is the fresh encounter with the novel, an encounter that is felt before it is thought, or, even more radically, felt in excess of any recuperative thought. *Kant, the father of Romanticism*.

The *Critique of Judgment* has two main sections, a discussion of aesthetic judgment, that is, the judgments of beauty and of the sublime, and a discussion of teleological judgment, that is, the judgment of the purposiveness (the way in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts and in fact determines the meaning and function of the parts) of organisms and of nature as a whole. Think art and nature together.

In the aesthetic judgment of beauty, an external object is judged as capable of provoking a harmonious interplay of imagination and understanding; the sublime, on the other hand, is the judgment that an external object is capable of provoking a disharmony of imagination and reason. In beauty, nature appeals to us as a pleasant stimulus, as
provoking a disinterested non-sensuous pleasure; the sublime is the feeling that nature
overpowers us, that we are radically insufficient to match its physical power. But for
Kant, this very same physical insufficiency both provokes a violent torsion of our
faculties and reminds us of our radical moral superiority to violent nature. Thus,
sublimity becomes the feeling of pleasure through or even in painful violence (CJ 244-6).

Beautiful harmony; sublime violence.

The “antinomy of teleological judgment” (CJ 386-8) states that we must think
nature as mechanistic and yet as contingent in its particulars—there are no mechanistic
laws of biology, no “Newton of a blade of grass” (CJ 400)—and in relation to us. The
solution is to determine the supersensible basis of man’s lawfulness (that which was
precisely left indeterminate but thinkable by the Critique of Pure Reason) as the negative
idea of a non-discursive intellect (CJ 410). But this is inscrutable, so we must have
recourse to the idea of a moral architect God as the practical determination of the
supersensible. Thus nature and freedom are finally related in the thought of a moral
architect God who guarantees that nature must at least cooperate with our moral action
(CJ 444) Architect God.

In teleological judgment, organisms are not primarily seen as art, but as an
“analogon of life”, that is, a being in which each part is an end and means of itself, as in
the thought of a certain body politic, a Staatskörpers (CJ 375n). Yet, Kant insists, such
self-organising is inscrutable to us, because it would rely on the thought of a “living
matter”, hylozoism (CJ 374). Therefore, to understand organisms, even though we have
there a “remote analogy” with human purposes (CJ 375), we must ultimately, just as with
nature as a whole, invoke the necessary presupposition of an external moral and divine producer. *The organism as judgment of God.*

**Deleuze**

For Deleuze, nature is singular yet bi-directional, the abstract machine of stratification and destratification. Nature operates both in, on, and between the strata, and also beyond them, on the place of consistency. *Bi-polar nature.*

Professor Challenger\(^8\) tells us that stratification is a lobster-good, the double articulation of content and expression, each of which has both substance and form. A substance is a “formed matter”, and refers to territorialities or spacial bindings; a form, on the other hand, implies a “code”, or temporal ordering. Content is production of “formed matter”, matter selected (territorialised) and formed (coded), while expression is production of a “functional structure” that utilises this content to produce a new entity by “overcoding”, resulting in “phenomena of centering, unification, totalization, integration, hierarchization and finalization” (*ATP* 41). *Double articulation is the working of the Lobster-God.*

More detail is necessary, for the Lobster-God is complex. The abstract machine of stratification has four processes in two articulations. The first process is sedimentation, which determines: (a) substance of content, that is, the selection of homogenous materials from a subordinate flow; and (b) a form of content, that is, the deposition of these materials in to layers. The second process is “folding”, in which there is: (c) a form of
expression, that is, the creation of new linkages; and (d) a substance of expression, the creation of new entities with emergent properties (ATP, p 43). *Sediment and fold.*

A body is any economic system considered as a mechanism of capture and appropriation, a region of matter-energy flow that has a relative consistency, even as it is plugged into a network of other flows, slowing them down, cooling them off. But bodies are not all powerful in their captures. A body is also defined by what overpowers it, by what escapes it. Deleuze uses the Nietzschean language of “dominant and dominated forces”, to explain that “every relationship of forces constitutes a body—whether it is chemical, biological, social, or political”⁹. A social body: the student body, the Corps of Engineers. A political body: the body politic. A body is a differential ratio of rate of capture over rate of escape. *Differential corporeal systems.*

An organism is that which regulates the rates of capture and escape for a body. Organs are machines, that is, flow/break couplings in which a matter-energy flow is interrupted and part siphoned off to flow in the slower economy of the body. Organs are a body’s way of negotiating with the outside, appropriating and slowing down a bit of matter-energy flow. Organs are points of intensity of matter-energy, a place of activity less intense than the surrounding outside but more intense that the body’s other organs (with regard to particular flow, that is). *Organs as limited intensities.*

An organism is a particular organisation of organs, one that is centralised and hierarchical, appropriating the matter-energy of the organs and funnelling a surplus portion of them to the benefit of the organism as a transcendence relative to its organs, a superior body that has appropriated the organs as labour. Through its organisation of the organs, each one biting into a regulating a flow, an organism is a thickening or
coagulation of flows of biomass and genetic material\textsuperscript{10}. The organism is thus a stratum with regard to those flows, “a phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labor from the BwO [Body without Organs], imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations, organized transcendences” (\textit{ATP} 159). \textit{The organism profits from the labour of the organs.}

Organisms occur in at least two registers: one strictly biological, the other political. But it is the same abstract machine of stratification, the same Lobster-God operant in any register from geological to social as the way to appropriate matter-energy flows from the Earth and build a layer that slows down the flow and funnels a surplus to a transcendently organised body. The abstract machine of stratification is biological and political at once. \textit{The geology of morals set forth by the Lobster-God is bio-political organisation.}

The political sense of organism means the oedipalised body of Anti-Oedipus, that is, one whose desire has been captured and patterned by a social machine. The organism as oedipalised body is a selection of a subset of the possible connections of the body, orienting it to docile reproductive labour. What is reproduced? Either products at work (hylomorphic labour reproducing form given by the master’s organ of voice) or species reproduction via heterosexual penile-vaginal intercourse. The political organism can be on the scale of the “individual” or on the scale of the body politic. The body politics organised as an organism: the totalitarian body. \textit{Oedipal desire entails the organisation of an organism.}
Culture, or the social machine, is a recompensatory reterritorialisation or stratification to make up for a previous deterritorialisation on the organic stratum. Culture, that is, machinic assemblages operating on the alloplastic stratum, selects from a vastly larger pool of potential connections, opened up due to the deterritorialisation of some of our organs (ATP, p. 61). Thus culture is a huge reterritorialisation to compensate for our deterritorialisation on the organic stratum. Oedipalisation is the form of that reterritorialisation. It is stratification, that is, selection and consolidation. The social machine selects from the set of potential organ connections and consolidates them, via a series of exclusive disjunctions, into fixed and seemingly irrevocable patterns of allowable organ connections. *Compensatory cultural reterritorialisation.*

A body without organs, or BwO, is a misnomer. No body can do away with its organs. Rather, a BwO is a non-organismically organised body. Or rather “it” is not a all, but is only the limit of a given process of destratification, the point at which a particular organisation of organs called an organism no longer holds and matter-energy flows are arranged immanently without reference to a transcendence profiting from the siphoning action of the organismically organised organs. A BwO cannot be wished into existence; it is an object of construction, a practice; it is “what remains after you take everything away” (*ATP* 151). It is not approached by regression, since it is there all along, besides the organism as its “road not taken”. Thus the BwO is approached not through regression, but by a systematic practice of disturbing the organism to unlock its forgotten potentials: “The BwO is not at all the opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism” (*ATP* 158). *The immanence of the BwO to the organism.*
One might think a BwO is the matter-energy flow itself subtending a body, but this is only a representation of what might have been a BwO had it been left alone, but instead became a substratum viewed from a stratum\textsuperscript{11}. Strictly speaking, a BwO is the limit of the process of destratification of a stratum or organism, and hence the “phase space: of the body that suffered being made into an organism, its virtual field, the pool of potentials for an organisation of that body—organismic organisation, and other types of organisations as well\textsuperscript{12}. What we really have is an organism as limit of a process, just as a BwO is limit of a process. The organism and the body without organs are limits of the opposed processes stratification and destratification. There is no such thing as an organism or a BwO. Both are representations of limits of processes. “An organism” is only a representation of pure molar fixity, just as “a BwO” is only a representation of pure molecular flow. The organism versus the BwO is only a de jure distinction, but Deleuze insists that such ideal purity never obtains in the world. All we have are de facto mixes, bodies consisting of varying ratios of stratifying and destratifying. After all, a stratum is itself only a ratio of capture versus escape. \textit{The non-existence of the organism and of the body without organs.}

Why are there only representations of bodies that have reached the limit of the process of stratification (an organism) and destratification (the body without organs)? Because of the relation of actual and virtual: we expand the actual by incorporating more of the virtual, but the two can never fully overlap; the virtual must remain as adjacent, as the road not taken, and the nagging reminder of what might have been. Thus working towards your BwO is not regression, but tapping into previously deselected potentials, a refreshing dip into the pool of the virtual in order to re-organise in a non-organismic
fashion, to gain a new non-organism body. That not all BwOs are ethically worth selecting is not the point here. The organism is pure actuality, pure selection that has dispensed with disturbance from the virtual deselected option, while a BwO is pure virtuality, the never-never land of never having to make choices. Neither exists. The *non-equivalence of the actual and the virtual.*

To note the non-existence of organism and BwO is not to say that bodies cannot move towards either limit. Approaching the BwO is expanding the virtual realm and incorporating it into the actual organisation of the body with inclusive disjunctions that do not shut off a potential, even when another is temporarily selected. A body must be organised to some extent: it must have a coordination of organs that negotiate with the external flows. But with inclusive disjunctions those organs can have roles that shift about, experimentally, over time. Approaching the organism, on the other hand, is organising a body with exclusive disjunctions, so that, once the organism's pattern of organs is set up, its virtual options are forbidden. The difference between inclusive and exclusive disjunctions in organisation is easy to see in the political sense of organism as oedipalised desire—(in this context, inclusive disjunction is nothing more than the ability to make connections that are not reproductive)—but a little harder to see in the biological. But exactly that biological fluidity is the whole point of creative involution.

*Incorporation of the virtual via inclusive disjunction is the criterion of ethical selection for the organisation of bodies.*

Deleuze appears as a philosophical joker or provocateur when he says God is a Lobster (*ATP* 40). But as refreshing as Deleuze’s introjection of humor into philosophy is, he is also serious about the Lobster-God. In keeping with his Lucretian, Nietzschean,
Spinozist heritage, he is committed to the immanence of natural processes. Now, for Spinoza, God and Nature were equivalent Deus sive Natura. Deleuze’s commitment to Spinoza is not to his notion of God, however, but to his insistence on the immanence of natural processes. Given his historical context, which defined God as transcendent, Spinoza’s insistence on immanence was seen as atheism. So if for us God is defined as transcendent, then Deleuze and Spinoza are indeed atheists. Now Deleuze does not say that the abstract machine is God, rather that God is a Lobster. The lobster as organism is doubly articulated, the result of the process of stratification symbolised by the Lobster-God. But the abstract machine of nature is not just stratification producing organisms, but also destratification producing the plane of consistency. So the Lobster-God is neither transcendent, nor is he all of nature, but only one aspect of nature as abstract machine of stratification and destratification. The partiality of the Lobster-God.

When God is not being a Lobster for Deleuze, he is the name of a transcendental illusion sometimes occurring in alloplastic strata. The overcoding of earth/tribe codes pushes the social recording surface onto the body of despot filiated with a sky god (AO 194). All credit for production goes to this transcendent God. But this is a transcendental illusion produced by an immanent process. Critique is the refusal to use concepts derived from products to discuss their own production process. Thus the ground cannot resemble that which it grounds: the virtual cannot resemble the actual. The stratification process as part of the abstract machine of nature does not resemble strata; God as part of the abstract machine, as the Lobster-God of stratification, is responsible for, but does not resemble, that which is produced, God as transcendent entity on which the organism is
modeled. “God is a Lobster” is a critical statement that exposes the illusion of the organism as the judgment of God.


2 For purposes of orthographic simplicity I shall use “Deleuze” in this essay to indicate both his singular thought and that of deleuze and Guattari. The emergent effects of their collaboration should not be underestimated, but cannot be dealt with in this format.

3 For example, the inspired and beautiful rant at Anti-Oedipus, pp. 268-9. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1983). Hereafter referred to as AO.

4 Deleuze’s explicit lack of interest in the thesis of the end of philosophy of the closure of metaphysics—“I’ve never worried about going beyond metaphysics or any death of philosophy”, Deleuze says in “On Philosophy,” in Negotiations, 1972-90, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 136—does not mean that he would not acknowledge fundamental structures in what he calls state philosophy. He merely wants to highlight the arbitrary nature of the Hiedeggerian and Derridean canons that allow that thesis to be constructed. Deleuze will affirm the existence of a current of philosophers—the stoics, Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche (his—Deleuze’s—Nietzsche, to be sure!), Bergson, Foucault—who do not fit the Heideggerian and Derridean canon and whose “thought of the outside” provides resources for novel creation of concepts, the ongoing life of philosophy.


7 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), p. 204. Pluhar puts the Akademie Ausgabe (AA) pagination in the margins. I cite the AA pages. Hereafter referred to as CJ.

8 “Professor Challenger” is the nom de plume adopted by Deleuze and Guattari in the ‘Geology of Morals’ plateau of A Thousand Plateaus.

10 On these and other points in my reading of Deleuze, see Manuel A. DeLanda, *A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History* (New York, Zone Books, 1987).

11 One of my few criticisms of DeLanda’s *A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History* is the passage at 261-2 naming BwOs as if they were entities.


