

Excerpt from "Introduction to Metaphysics" [1903] (*Key Writings*, 274-282)  
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[protevi@lsu.edu](mailto:protevi@lsu.edu) / [www.protevi.com/johh/Bergson/IM.pdf](http://www.protevi.com/johh/Bergson/IM.pdf)

- I) Nine Numbered theses
  - A) There is an external reality given independently to our mind.
  - B) This reality is mobility
    - 1) Cf. "substantiality of change" thesis from "The Perception of Change"
    - 2) Rest is only relative (synchronicity of changes)
    - 3) We move from inner duration to seeing duration everywhere
    - 4) Reality = tendency (nascent change of direction)
  - C) Our mind substitutes, for practical reasons, immobility for mobility
  - D) Metaphysical problems come from this substitution
    - 1) We can go from mobility to immobility by extraction
    - 2) But there is no way to go from immobility to mobility by addition
  - E) The error of criticism (Kant) is to try to go from rigid concept to fluid reality
  - F) Intuition is possible, by a violent reversal of tendency of thought to stasis
  - G) We have a hint of this reversal in calculus
    - 1) Attempt to think becoming, to follow growth of magnitudes
    - 2) It is not yet philosophy, being only the science of magnitudes via symbols
    - 3) Metaphysics can abstain from symbols and stay with intuition
    - 4) But "quantity is always nascent quality"; quantity is limit of quality
    - 5) Thus metaphysics can extend "generative method" of calculus to all qualities
    - 6) Thus metaphysics is to "operate differentiations and qualitative integrations"
  - H) We have lost track of the intuition of mobility at heart of modern science by focusing on the symbols used for precise transmission of knowledge
    - 1) What is "relative" about science is move from stasis to mobility via symbols
    - 2) Intuition of fluid reality attains the absolute
    - 3) So science and metaphysics meet in intuition, in intuitive philosophy
  - I) Ancient philosophy vs modern science
    - 1) Plato and ancients believed the immobile was primary
    - 2) Modern science begins w/ Galileo recognizing independent reality of motion
- II) The role of understanding is fixing intuition in symbols
  - A) But "philosophy should be an effort to go beyond the human state"
  - B) Understanding at work in science and metaphysics
    - 1) Scientists have focused on symbols that express intuition regarding relations
    - 2) As has metaphysics, regarding things
  - C) Kant picks up here, pushing science and metaphysics to limits of symbolism
    - 1) This relies on his misunderstanding of intellectual intuition [as divine]
    - 2) In reality, Kant only applies to a Platonized (unified) science and metaphysics
  - D) For Bergson
    - 1) Negative views:
      - (a) Metaphysics is not the construction of a system from pre-existing ideas
      - (b) Nor is science the construction of a universal mathematics
    - 2) Positive views
      - (a) Metaphysics is "constant dilation of our mind ... constantly renewed effort"

- (b) Science is disunified: “starting from multiple and varied intuitions .. not always fitting into one another”
- E) Again, Kant presupposes a Platonic view of science and metaphysics
  - 1) Kant:
    - (a) science is pre-formed, a “logic immanent in things”
    - (b) metaphysics is locked into antinomies
  - 2) Bergson
    - (a) Science is disunified:
    - (b) Metaphysics is contact with living reality, not manipulation of symbols
      - (i) Never get gray via contradictions of black and white [critique of standard reading of Hegel]
      - (ii) But if you start w/ concrete universal of gray, you can see black / white
- F) Key: analysis (understanding) depends on intuition, which hides behind analysis
- III) Conclusion: intuition is not mysterious
  - A) Example of literary composition
    - 1) Gathering together of notes
    - 2) Placing yourself at the heart of the subject allows an “impulsion”
    - 3) But if you turn around on this impulsion you objectify it and thus destroy it
  - B) [we can try to put this in modern neuroscientific terms]
    - 1) [impulsion is collapse of chaos in onset of a resonant cell assembly]
    - 2) [such an RCA itself can never be made an object of introspection, because it is that by which object formation operates]
  - C) Metaphysical intuition collects scientific facts, but in “fusing” them, it overcomes the preliminary and fixed conceptions inherent in scientific work
    - 1) One reason for decline of metaphysics is the scattering of science
    - 2) But metaphysics is not a summary of scientific facts
    - 3) It is rather integrated experience [recall the bit about integration above]