

# Speech and Phenomena – Chapter 1 “Sign and Signs”

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## I. Preliminary distinction: "sign" = *Zeichen* [17-18b]

### A. two components

1. expression = *Ausdruck* = *bedeutsam Zeichen* ["meaningful sign"]

2. indication = *Anzeichen*

a. has no expression of *Sinn* or *Bedeutung*

b. *bedeutsamlos Zeichen*

### B. tie of *Ausdruck*/expression [has *Bedeutung*] to *Rede* [speech]

1. *Ausdruck* is purely linguistic

2. *bedeuten* = "mean" = want to say = *vouloir-dire*

a. = relation to possible object

b. = pure logicity [= grammar for presentation of an object]

(1) *widersinnig* = countersense

(a) grammar for possible object

(b) but no factual object

i) empirical [mountain of gold]

ii) a priori [square circle]

(2) *sinnlos* = nonsense ["abracadabra" "green is or"]

## II. EH vs Frege [18c-20a]

### A. Frege:

1. *Sinn* = meaning = concept

2. *Bedeutung* = referent

### B. Husserl:

1. in the *LI*: no distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*

2. in *Ideas I* [124]:

a. meaning = *Bedeutung* = ideal content of verbal expression

b. sense = *Sinn* = whole noematic sphere [incl nonexpression]

(1) *noema* = intentional correlate

(2) pre-expressive stratum of lived experience

(3) able to receive expression and meaning

(a) via passage to infinite as idealization

(b) as reflected in phenomenologically reduced voice

## III. functional, not substantial distinction btw expression/indication [20b-21]

A. depends on intentional experience that animates the sign

B. entanglement/interweaving = *Verflechtung* = in communicative speech

1. each factual expression is communicative

2. *de facto* necessary interweaving cannot eliminate *de jure* distinction

a. this distinction is the ground of phenomenology

b. does not exist prior to language;

(1) *de facto*: discovered only in language

(2) *de jure*: depends on distinction btw indication/expression

C. expression is caught up in indication, but not vice versa

1. this tempts us to make indication the genus

a. so that speech is a gesture

b. essence of speech belongs to signification/indication

2. Husserl contests this possible interpretation

- a.must isolate a phenomenological situation of pure expression
- b.monological voice of solitary mental life

#### IV.Economy of exteriority [22a]

- A.suspension of a certain outside reveals space of intuition of object
- B.transcendental phenomenological idealism

##### 1.describes:

- a.objectivity of object
- b.presence of present
- c.objectivity in presence

##### 2.from standpoint of intereriority = self-proximity

- a.BUT, not a simple inside
- b.rather, relation to a beyond and exteriority in general
  - (1)=spacing
  - (2)and through spacing, empiricity, indication, etc

#### V.Question of sign in general [23b-26]

##### A.dogmatic haste in repressing this question

##### 1.which he must presuppose in distinguishing two types of signs

- a.must have a precomprehension of the essence of "sign"
- b.sign in general must be a form, not a genus

##### 2.EH's evasion of the question

- a.sign for something
- b.structure of substitution or reference [*Zeigen* in general]

##### (1)distinction:

- (a)expressive reference = *Hinzeigen*
- (b)indicative reference = *Anzeigen*

##### (2) *Zeigen* as root of this distinction is root of interweaving

##### (3)logic as theme predisposes EH to expression/ *Hinzeigen*

##### (a) *telos* intervening in *eidos*

##### B.critical vigilance in deferring the question

##### 1.perhaps two irreducible concepts improperly bound under same name

##### 2.form of question "what is" in "what is sign in general"

##### a.putting signification under ontology

- (1)subjection of sign to truth
- (2)language to being
- (3)speech to thought
- (4)writing to speech

##### b.what if sign constituted truth/essence/being?

##### c.sign as structure of an intentional movement a thing

##### C.reversing the traditional procedure

##### 1.EH attentive to language producing ideal objectivity [*ITOG*]

##### 2.this is not a simple move

##### a.two motifs of phenomenology

##### (1)reduction of naive ontology

- (a)=return to active constitution of sense
- (b)=activity of a life producing truth through signs

##### (2)confirming classical metaphysics of presence

- (a)registration of sense in intuition preserved in voice
- (b)point-source of LP

