

Speech and Phenomena – Chapter 1 “Sign and Signs”

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I.Preliminary distinction: "sign" = *Zeichen* [17-18b]

A.two components

1.expression = *Ausdruck* = *bedeutsam Zeichen* ["meaningful sign"]

2.indication = *Anzeichen*

a.has no expression of *Sinn* or *Bedeutung*

b. *bedeutsamlos Zeichen*

B.tie of *Ausdruck*/expression [has *Bedeutung*] to *Rede* [speech]

1.*Ausdruck* is purely linguistic

2.*bedeuten* = "mean" = want to say = *vouloir-dire*

a.= relation to possible object

b.= pure logicality [= grammar for presentation of an object]

(1) *widersinnig* = countersense

(a)grammar for possible object

(b)but no factual object

i)empirical [mountain of gold]

ii)a priori [square circle]

(2) *sinnlos* = nonsense ["abracadabra" "green is or"]

II.EH vs Frege [18c-20a]

A.Frege:

1. *Sinn* = meaning = concept

2. *Bedeutung* = referent

B. Husserl:

1.in the *LI*: no distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*

2.in *Ideas I* [124]:

a.meaning = *Bedeutung* = ideal content of verbal expression

b.sense = *Sinn* = whole noematic sphere [incl nonexpression]

(1) *noema* = intentional correlate

(2)pre-expressive stratum of lived experience

(3)able to receive expression and meaning

(a)via passage to infinite as idealization

(b)as reflected in phenomenologically reduced voice

III.functional, not substantial distinction btw expression/indication [20b-21]

A.depends on intentional experience that animates the sign

B.entanglement/interweaving = *Verflechtung* = in communicative speech

1.each factual expression is communicative

2. *de facto* necessary interweaving cannot eliminate *de jure* distinction

a.this distinction is the ground of phenomenology

b.does not exist prior to language;

(1) *de facto*: discovered only in language

(2) *de jure*: depends on distinction btw indication/expression

C.expression is caught up in indication, but not vice versa

1.this tempts us to make indication the genus

a.so that speech is a gesture

b.essence of speech belongs to signification/indication

2. Husserl contests this possible interpretation

- a.must isolate a phenomenological situation of pure expression
- b.monological voice of solitary mental life

IV.Economy of exteriority [22a]

- A.suspension of a certain outside reveals space of intuition of object
- B.transcendental phenomenological idealism

1.describes:

- a.objectivity of object
- b.presence of present
- c.objectivity in presence

2.from standpoint of intereriority = self-proximity

- a.BUT, not a simple inside
- b.rather, relation to a beyond and exteriority in general
 - (1)=spacing
 - (2)and through spacing, empiricity, indication, etc

V.Question of sign in general [23b-26]

- A.dogmatic haste in repressing this question

- 1.which he must presuppose in distinguishing two types of signs
 - a.must have a precomprehension of the essence of "sign"
 - b.sign in general must be a form, not a genus

2.EH's evasion of the question

- a.sign for something
- b.structure of substitution or reference [*Zeigen* in general]

(1)distinction:

- (a)expressive reference = *Hinzeigen*
- (b)indicative reference = *Anzeigen*
- (2) *Zeigen* as root of this distinction is root of interweaving
- (3)logic as theme predisposes EH to expression/ *Hinzeigen*
 - (a) *telos* intervening in *eidos*

- B.critical vigilance in deferring the question

1.perhaps two irreducible concepts improperly bound under same name

2.form of question "what is" in "what is sign in general"

- a.putting signification under ontology
 - (1)subjection of sign to truth
 - (2)language to being
 - (3)speech to thought
 - (4)writing to speech

- b.what if sign constituted truth/essence/being?

- c.sign as structure of an intentional movement a thing

- C.reversing the traditional procedure

1.EH attentive to language producing ideal objectivity [ITOG]

2.this is not a simple move

- a.two motifs of phenomenology
 - (1)reduction of naive ontology
 - (a)=return to active constitution of sense
 - (b)=activity of a life producing truth through signs
 - (2)confirming classical metaphysics of presence
 - (a)registration of sense in intuition preserved in voice
 - (b)point-source of LP

