I. Introduction: *différance* unveiled as the supplement of presence [88a]
   A. action of *différance*:
      1. differring: retention
         a. self is lacking, gapped
         b. fold of a re-turn
      2. dererring: protention
         a. self is too much: rule of infinite addition
         b. IKS as form of LP
   B. inconceivability of *différance* starting from cness
      1. presence
      2. homogenous complication of time-line
   C. JD's project:
      1. how well do supplement and *différance* respect
      2. distinction of signs and presence

II. supplement as structure of sign in general {"in place of"} [88b-89b]
   A. "for-itself" of the subject from "in place of" of signs
      1. traditionally: subjectivity as self-giving
      2. but for JD: presence of cness, its self-relation, only through *différance* of retention/protention: re-presentation, trace, signs
   B. full structure of supplementarity:
      1. a possibility which produces by delayed action [à retardement] that to which it is said to be added
         a. cf. *Of Grammatology*: Rousseau discussion of Origin of Lang
         b. also "Freud and Scene of Writing" for Nachtraglichkeit
      2. signifier supplements other type of signifier
         a. substituted for is more highly valued bcs more ideal
         b. more valued bcs *différance* is movement of idealization
         c. more ideal = more preservation of presence of sense
      3. so, e.g., indication replaces expression in real comm
         a. bcs sense intended by another are never present to me
         b. thus the sense must be indicated

III. how is expression itself nonfull? [89c-91b]
   A. intuitionist epistemology determines EH's theory of language
      1. but we still can speak, even w/o knowing
      2. pure logical grammar determines speech even w/o knowl.
   B. EH's last reduction: bracketing meaning-fulfilling intuitions
      1. act of meaning always aims at an object
      2. this intention is enough;
         a. no need to fulfill this intention
         b. with intuition of what is meant in its presence
      3. so absence of object does not affect expression of meaning

IV. pure logical grammar [91c-97a]
   A. depends on distinction of countersense vs nonsense
      1. countersense:
         a. no possible object for empirical or a priori reasons
         b. but being w/o object being w/o meaning
c. yet conforms to grammar for presenting an object
   (1) so we can at least understand that no object is possible
2. nonsense
   a. breaks grammar rules for presenting an object
B. if it is possible not to have an object and yet still have meaning, then absence of object is necessary possibility of meaning
   1. meaning-fulfilling intuition [=truth] fuses intuition and intention
   2. in fusion, language [meaning w/o intuition] is effaced
   3. has EH overlooked two possibilities here?:
      a. that intuition and intention can never be homogenously fused
      b. that meaning can be fused w/intuition w/o disappearing
4. in EH's own descriptions:
   a. example of expression about perception shows heterogeneity of intuition and intention [meaning]
   b. bcs. non-intuition of intendent object of ideal content of expression is essential part of possibility of meaning
      (1) obviously of object referred to
      (2) and for addressee
      (3) but also even for speaker
      (4) thus "death of author/writer"
5. "going further": "writing" in "living speech"
   a. questions:
      (1) writing [neither real nor ideal] as passage to ideality
      (2) link of death, idealization, repetition, signification
   b. example of the personal pronoun "I":
      (1) "essentially occasional expression"
         (a) neither contingent polysema
         (b) nor absolute univocity of "objective" expressions
         (c) thus they cannot be replaced by conceptual content w/o distorting meaning of the expression
      (2) thus indication whenever reference to speaker is irreducible
   3. EH wants meaning of "I" to be realized for speaker
      (a) that is, presentation of the object to which it refers
      (b) that is, I as object for myself, here, now
   4. JD objects:
      (a) even in solitary monologue, the "I" is an ideality
      (b) thus can function in my absence
      (c) that is, w/o intuition of the object "I, here, now"
         i) this absence is the very entrance of ergo sum
         ii) and T ego
            a) that is, thought of empirical absence of subject
            b) reveals form of thinking subject
   5. EH contradicts himself
      (a) [revealing his desire: self-presence, pure life]
   6. death as condition of living subjectivity, signification
      (a) autonomy of meaning has its norm in writing / death
      (b) writing as condition of speech
   c. conclusion: all these are drawn from idea of pure logical grammar
V. Husserl's desire [97b-99a]
A. meaning as aim w/o object limited by telos of vision [of object]
   1. symbol points to truth [=presence of object] as it is constituted as lack of truth
2. speech w/o object is false speech; its telos is truth [=fusion of intention and intuition]
3. telos of fulfilling intuition sets up sense as relation to object

B. formality of pure logical grammar is limited
1. by determination of sense as possibility of object-presentation
2. form is always form of object-presentation
   a. emptiness
   b. pure intention of intentionality
3. thus intuitionism weighs heavily on formalism of EH
   a. form of meaning [intention is meaningful even w/o intuition]
   b. is guided by telos of intuition fulfilling intention
4. expressions in form S is P, even w/ impossible obj, make sense
   a. bcs another object can be presented in that form
   b. thus "nonsense" of signs not obeying these rules only on basis of prior, traditional determination of truth as objectivity
5. poetic and nondiscursive signification is denied form of sense
   a. bcs they cannot present objects
6. conclusion: thus we should recognize an initial limitation
   a. of sense to knowledge [of objects as truth in intuition-intention]
   b. of logos to objectivity
   c. of language to reason

VI. Conclusions [99b-104e]
A. systematic interdependence of concepts of sense, ideality, objectivity, truth, intuition, perception, expression in matrix of presence
   1. self-presence allowing repetition
   2. LP thus links phenomenology to metaphysics
      a. LP thought as ideality
      b. nevertheless it is factually deferred
      c. thus différance is relation of ideality and factuality
B. demonstration:
   1. substitution of content of essentially subjective expression by objective, ideal content is itself only ideal
   2. since ideality is IKS, this substitution is deferred
C. thus "essential distinctions" are teleologically ordered, and deferred
   1. aporia:
      a. de facto/realiter they are never respected
      b. de jure/idealiter they vanish,
         (1) since they live only from distinction of fact and right
         (2) which is never respected
   2. thus différance, their condition of possibility, is cond. of imposs.
D. what is presence as différance ad infinitum?
   1. for EH, [EH's descriptions vs. Hegel's thematics]
      a. since infinity is IKS
         (1) never derives difference from plenitude, positive infinite
         (2) nor believed in AK as self-presence of concept in logos
         (3) shown by descriptions of temporalization
      b. yet, EH has thematics of metaphysics of presence
   2. now, for Hegel [now show Hegel's descriptions vs. EH's thematics]
      a. Hegelianism advantageous bcs it demands passage through positive infinite so that indefiniteness of différance appear as such
1. need to look in *Science of Logic*
2. and also "Violence and Metaphysics"
   b. so Hegel's critique of Kant would hold for Husserl
3. JD's position: *différance* and death
   a. [contra Hegel]: relation to my death allows appearance of *différance*
      1. cf. "Restricted and General Economy", where Hegel is shown to substitute truth of death for my death
   2. EH opens T ego and temporality through relation to my death
   b. [contra Husserl]: compared to ideality of positive infinite, my death is empirical accident
      1. so infinite *différance* is finite
      2. thus *différance* escapes opposition of finite and infinite
E. closure of metaphysics of presence
1. AK as closure, as end of history
2. AK as unity of concept, logos, and cness in voice w/o differance
3. history of metaphysics
   a. = unfolding of will to s'entendre-parler
   b. this history closes when voice appears to itself as its own death
      1. so SP is last chapter of JD's *Phen of Spirit!* or his history of being!
F. "beyond" the closure:
1. "unheard of" thoughts sought across memory of old signs
   a. writing strategies needed
2. beyond AK, approaching that which announced its closure [= *différance*]
3. new names are needed
   a. to conceive as normal
   b. what EH wanted to exclude as abnormal, accidental
      1. that is, drift of signs
      2. linking representations one to the other w/o end
         a. thus, there never was any "perception"
         b. and presentation is only rep. of rep. yearning for itself
4. picture gallery image
   a. this play of signs is not comprehended by intuition
5. we must speak, then, make our voices resonate, to supplement breakup of presence
   a. the phoneme is the phenomenon of the labyrinth
6. contrary to phenomenolgy and our desire,
   a. thing itself always escapes
   b. "look" cannot abide