

In composing these notes, I've benefitted from the various SEP articles on Kant, and from Jeffrey Tlumack's *Classical Modern Philosophy* (Routledge, 2007)

INTRODUCTORY LECTURE ON KANT

Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804, is the capstone in traditional courses in M&E (metaphysics and epistemology) of the modern European period. Kant is often the capstone because he claims to overcome the dispute between the "rationalists" (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz) and the "empiricists" (Locke, Hume).

We're only going to be able to introduce you to some of the key terms and a few of the famous arguments of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, though we will mention its relation to the *Critique of Practical Reason*. A "critique" will establish the "limits and possibility" of the topic under examination. Each of Kant's first two critiques has an "interest" and a ruling "faculty."

	Interest	Ruling faculty
Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)	Knowledge	Understanding
Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR)	Morality	Reason

As you can see, Kant thought humans had "faculties"; these are ordered, but not in a chronological process. Rather, they are logically ordered with the later ones dependent upon the earlier ones.

- Sensibility allows us to passively receive sensory input.
- Understanding allows us to actively know objects in the manifold by bringing them under concepts.
- Reason pushes us to bring our conceptual knowledge into an orderly system.

In the CPR, each of the faculties has empirical and pure applications.

	Empirical	Pure
Sensibility	Sense data or "intuitions" This tan thing here and now	Space and Time = "a priori forms of intuition"
Understanding	Concepts used in judgments "This is a lion"	Categories: substance, CE ... "a priori concepts of understanding"
Reason	Scientific investigations: "All lions are mammals"	Ideas: God, world, soul. Limited to regulative use in knowledge

There's one other faculty, "imagination," which plays a key role in the complex story of the CPR. Imagination is the power to synthesize the sensory manifold, to present it as ordered and centered in one experience, so that the understanding can do its conceptual work.

Technically speaking, the transcendental imagination, in the schematism, translates categories into temporal orderings of the manifold. According to Heidegger's interpretation, the TI or power of schematism is the "common root" of sensibility and understanding.

Let's look at the key term "reason."

- Speculative reason is a "drive" to complete a system of thought.
- Critical reason is reason's ability to set limits to itself.
 - So critical reason is what limits speculative reason to a "regulative" use and forbids the "constitutive" use when employed in the interest of knowledge, but allows it to practical reason in the interest of morality.
- Practical reason is reason's ability to order itself to submit to the moral law that it gives itself.

Transcendental Philosophy is what the CPR aims to produce.

Transcendental = knowledge, not of objects, but of how objects can appear to us.

So, "transcendental" = knowledge of a priori conditions of possible experience.

T philosophy knows that legitimate empirical knowledge requires application of categories to intuitions guided by "regulative" Ideas.

The Ideas of pure reason when pursuing the interest of knowledge do have a guiding or regulative function as providing the horizon of unity for empirical investigation. To do science we have to assume that the world is a system ruled by laws of nature.

Thus, T Phil is also knowledge that dogmatic metaphysics is the illegitimate application of "constitutive" Ideas to categories w/o intuitions.

It's illegitimate metaphysics to say that the soul is a substance, that God caused the world to exist, that the world is infinite – or limited – in time and space.

However, when pursuing the interest of morality, the Ideas are necessary presuppositions: we have to believe in God as moral author of the world and that we have an immortal soul susceptible of reward or punishment in the afterlife.

Thus in a very famous line encapsulating the standpoint of Transcendental Philosophy, Kant said he had to write the CPR in order to "limit knowledge to make room for faith."

The key question of the CPR is "how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?"

a priori = that which is prior to experience, and as such universal and necessary;

a posteriori = that which is after experience, and as such never universal and necessary;

Analytic judgment: predicate in subject ("bachelor is unmarried man"); explicates, but no new knowledge;

Synthetic judgment = predicate not in subject ("some bachelors are unhappy"); creates new knowledge;

Synthetic *a priori* judgments = universal and necessary, prior to experience, but creates new knowledge: ("all events have causes"; there's no predicate "causes" in the subject "event")

	Analytic a priori	Synthetic, a posteriori	Synthetic a priori
Hume	Relations of Ideas	Matters of Fact	
Kant	Predicate in subject	Predicate not in subject	Categories

The CPR is structured as follows.

There are two Doctrines: Elements and Method. We will only look at the Elements.

The Elements have two Parts: T Aesthetic (space and time) and T Logic.

T Logic has two Divisions: T Analytic (how we know things) and T Dialectic (problems for unlimited reason).

T Analytic is divided into Concepts (categories) and Principles (includes "schematism").

T Dialectic includes the "Paralogisms" (insoluble problems arising from trying to know the subject as substance, simple, etc) and "Antinomies" (insoluble problems arising from trying to know the world as limited or unlimited in time and space; as made up of wholes composed of atoms or which are infinitely divisible; as purely causal or as allowing for freedom; and requiring God as its necessary creator).

- I) Transcendental Doctrine of Elements
 - A) First Part: Transcendental Aesthetic
 - B) Second Part: Transcendental Logic
 - 1) First Division: Transcendental Analytic
 - (a) Book I: Analytic of Concepts
 - (i) The Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of Understanding
 - (ii) Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding
 - (b) Book II: Analytic of Principles
 - (i) Schematism
 - (ii) System of all Principles of Pure Understanding
 - (iii) Ground of Distinction of all Objects into Phenomena and Noumena
 - 2) Second Division: Transcendental Dialectic
 - (a) Introduction
 - (i) Transcendental Illusion
 - (ii) Pure Reason as Seat of Transcendental Illusion
 - (b) Book I: Concepts of Pure Reason
 - (c) Book II: Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason
 - (i) Paralogisms (psychology: soul)
 - (ii) Antinomy (cosmology: world)
 - (iii) Ideal of Pure Reason (theology: God)
- II) Transcendental Doctrine of Method
 - A) Discipline
 - B) Canon
 - C) Chapter 3. Architectonic
 - D) Chapter 4. History

THE PREFACES AND INTRODUCTION TO THE CPR

1: RECAP: Kant presents the CPR as solving the impasses of rationalism (dogmatism) and empiricism (skepticism).

A: From the rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz), Kant adopts the insistence that pure reason yields knowledge with universal and necessary validity.

But he limits this to transcendental philosophy, knowledge about the conditions of (empirical) knowledge. There is no a priori (universal and necessary) knowledge of the contents of the world. There is however transcendental a priori (universal and necessary) knowledge of the structures of experience.

That is, we know *how* the world must appear to us: as ordered in space and time and as conformable to the categories. In other words, we don't know what causes what prior to experience, but we do know *that* experience must be ordered in causal relations.

B: From the empiricists (Locke, Hume), Kant adopts the insistence that sensibility is a necessary source of our (empirical) knowledge.

But Kant rejects Hume's notion that the basic structures of our (empirical) knowledge – e.g., causation – are only principles of the association of ideas provided by human nature.

2: The A Preface

The A Preface begins with an unforgettable portrait of tragic reason: compelled to ask questions it can't avoid but can't answer.

It moves on to an important political metaphor; critique will establish a commonwealth of reason by ending state of nature or war of pre-critical metaphysics: some great stuff in the A Preface about Queen Metaphysics, the civil war among the dogmatists, the nomad skeptics, and the "indifferentists," who, although they relapse into dogmatism are at least a clue that we live in the age of criticism:

Our age is the very age of criticism, and everything must submit to it. Religion, on the strength of its sanctity, and legislation, on the strength of its majesty, try to exempt themselves from it; but they thereby arouse a just suspicion, and cannot claim that sincere respect which reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and open examination.

But has Kant taken critique all the way? Nietzsche among others mocks Kant for the way God, soul, and world show up once again, as practical postulates and objects of faith.

3: The B Preface:

A: The Copernican Revolution. Kant writes that logic, mathematics, and physics have all become scientific.

Logic has it easiest in that it deals only with the formal rules of thought, so it doesn't have to go outside itself and deal with objects.

Math and physics became scientific as the result of revolutions: instead of trying to observe objects and figure out the relation of their properties, thinkers learned they could be certain only of what they put into the construction of an object.

Math: if you define "triangle" ahead of time as "that which has three internal angles equal to 180 degrees," then you can be certain of that property of all triangles; you don't have to measure a bunch of them and compare the results.

Physics: Galileo and others realized that they must come up with laws and approach nature to make it sense of it based on their presuppositions. This keeps them from an aimless wandering in observation.

Similarly, Copernicus realized that if he assumed the earth was stable he couldn't make sense of things, but if he changed his perspective and assumed the earth was moving then he could figure out what was going on.

iii: What would be the analogy to the Copernican Revolution in metaphysics? What is the change in perspective we need? We need to change from assuming that our knowledge conforms to things to the assumption that *objects conform to our faculty of knowledge*.

We have to acknowledge that part of our knowledge is actively produced by us; that is, that "prior" to experience we supply the forms of intuition and the categories.

Now this active production must go to work on material provided by sensation. Kant names the active faculty "understanding" and the passive faculty "sensibility."

B: One of the consequences here however is that we must distinguish between appearances and things in themselves. There have been endless discussions here. We can just say to start that "appearances" are objects that conform to our faculties, while things in themselves do not.

Can Kant even say that? If he's limiting knowledge to what comes through our faculties how can he claim there is something "out there"?

Is Kant smuggling in some realism? This is the two-objects position (things in themselves exist and in fact they causally affect our sensibility).

Or is this just a thought; a sort of limit case? We can't know what an "intuitive intellect" would know (things-in-themselves) but we can posit that idea in contrast to what we do know (appearances).

C: The positive gain of critique: enabling practical reason. If we don't limit our knowledge to appearances, then we think we know things in themselves. But this conflicts with the basic

presupposition of morality, that people are the free origins of their actions (and can thereby be held responsible for them).

That is, we can't simultaneously uphold natural science (everything is causally enwebbed) and morality (free actions), UNLESS we distinguish the realm of natural science as that of appearances and allow the realm of morality to concern things in themselves.

Kant says that we can THINK things-in-themselves (it's not a contradiction to think that thought) but NOT KNOW them (since knowledge will be critically confined to intuition plus categories).

Hence the famous line: "I had to deny knowledge to make room for belief (or "faith")."

And in so doing, Kant thinks he can rescue us from "materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, disbelief, fanaticism, and superstition."

(Now I'm no fan of fatalism, fanaticism, and superstition, but I'm certainly tempted to materialism, atheism, free-thinking, and disbelief.)

4: The Introduction:

I: Pure vs empirical knowledge.

All our empirical knowledge begins (temporally) with sensation, but empirical knowledge is a compound of sensation (passively received) and what which sensation rouses into action, our understanding. *a priori* = that which is prior to experience.

II: We have a priori knowledge:

a priori = that which is prior to experience, and as such universal and necessary;
a posteriori = that which is after experience, and as such never universal and necessary.

Everyday life assumes that every change has a cause, but that could never be justified empirically, as Hume showed.

III: Philosophy needs a science that determines the possibility and range of a priori knowledge:

Metaphysics takes us beyond possible experience in its "problems" of God, freedom, and immortality. Our success at math can tempt us to indulge our desire for unlimited knowledge. Hence Plato flew off to the world of the ideas. In a massive mixed metaphor, Kant then says that speculative reason builds its splendid castles without assuring their foundations. We don't notice this though because of our success at analysis (which doesn't add content, but which reason uses as a pretense

to unconsciously and surreptitiously add positive content).

IV: Analytic vs synthetic judgments:

Analytic judgment: predicate in subject ("bachelor is unmarried man"); explicates, but no new knowledge;

Synthetic judgment = predicate not in subject ("some bachelors are unhappy"); creates new knowledge;

V: Synthetic *a priori* judgments = universal and necessary, prior to experience, but creates new knowledge: ("all events have causes"; there's no predicate "causes" in the subject "event")

	Analytic a priori	Synthetic, a posteriori	Synthetic a priori
Hume	Relations of Ideas	Matters of Fact	
Kant	Predicate in subject	Predicate not in subject	Categories

VI: General problem: "how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?"

In answering that, we determine how pure math and pure natural science are possible.

We see that metaphysics is a "natural disposition" (even though it's never made any progress); so what we really need to know is "how is metaphysics as a science possible"? The answer: as *Critique of Pure Reason*.

VII: Critique of Pure Reason as a "Special Science"

"I call all knowledge transcendental which deals not so much with objects as with our manner of knowing objects insofar as this manner is to be possible *a priori*."

The CPR is only preparatory to a system of transcendental philosophy.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC AND THE A DEDUCTION

1: The Transcendental Aesthetic

A: Kant's terminology:

Representations	
Immediate: Appearance (undetermined)	Mediate: Experience (determined)
Sensibility (passive / receptive)	Understanding (active / form-giving)
Intuition	
Empirical	Pure
Sensation	Pure intuition
Matter	Form
Color, hardness	Extension / Order
Sensible qualities	Space and Time
Thought	

B: Space and time are "empirically real" but "transcendentally ideal."

"Empirically real": means that from the standpoint of our experience, space (B 44) and time (B 52) are real, that is, that any possible experience is given in space and time.

"Transcendentally ideal" means that we contribute temporal ordering, so that we can say nothing about the temporal order of things-in-themselves. Space (B44) and time (B52) are "nothing" " when we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition.

2: Transcendental Analytic: Book I: Analytic of Concepts

A: Kant defines understanding as faculty of judgment. A judgment is a synthesis, a joining together of different representations into a single one. A judgment joins a predicate to a subject.

An example of an empirical concept is "lion," so the empirical judgment "this is a lion" joins together all the sensations of tan color, roaring, running, killing...

An example of a pure concept is "substance"; these pure concepts are presupposed in any empirical judgment (a "lion" is an empirical instance of a "substance"). The pure concepts are called "categories."

B: The road to the categories.

Pure logic = study of forms of thought.

Transcendental logic = study of a priori forms of thought as they structure our experience of objects. T Logic isolates the categories as these forms, or "rules" of synthesis.

We find a clue to the categories from the table of judgments: A 70 / B 95: Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality.

C: The categories (#10)

The categories are the pure, a priori, structures of thought. They are the "pure concepts of the understanding." Any exercise of the understanding, any empirical judgment with a knowledge claim, *must* conform to the categories. ("Any," "must" = universal and necessary.) Categories are rules for the synthesis of representations.

Kant stresses that he has systematically generated his list of categories (as opposed to the haphazard manner of Aristotle) from the structure of logical judgments, insofar as judgment is the function of the understanding.

The empirical concept of "lion" enables us to think an object of intuition as "a lion," that is, to unify tan color, large shape, loud roar, big teeth, fast running, antelope killing ... under the concept of "lion."

The pure category of substance must underlie the empirical judgment "this is a lion," (as do other categories in the other areas: Totality*, Reality, and Existence). *There is debate as to whether a singular judgment should correlate with "unity" rather than with "totality" (which seems to line up with "universal" judgments.)

Judgments	Categories	Principles
Quantity: Universal: all S is P Particular: some S is P Singular: this S is P	Quantity: Unity Plurality Totality (plurality as unity)	Quantity: Axioms of Intuition
Quality Affirmative: S is P Negative: S is not P Infinite: S is (not P)	Quality Reality Negation Limitation	Quality: Anticipations of Perception
Relation Categorical: All S is P Hypothetical: If S, then P Disjunctive: S or P	Relation Substance / Accident Cause / Effect Reciprocity: agent / patient	Relation: Analogies of Experience
Modality Problematic: Assertoric Apodeictic	Modality Possibility / impossibility Existence / non-existence Necessity / contingency	Modality: Postulates of Empirical Thought in General

The categories are the condition for objective judgments. That means a judgment that claims knowledge of an object, and in that way makes a claim that other people can in principle agree or disagree with. (No one can agree or disagree with a perceptual judgment, "this rock seems heavy to me"; but someone can agree or disagree with the judgment "this rock weighs 52 pounds." You have used the category of substance and accident here as a rule of synthesizing "rock" and "52 pounds" – the latter is a reading of lines on a scale.)

3: The Transcendental Deduction (in the first edition; the "A Deduction")

The Deduction justifies the objective validity of the categories. The categories are empty in themselves; they only function as the pure, a priori, structures or forms of thought, as rules

of synthesis that constitute an object of knowledge. Kant's famous slogan: "thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind" (B 75).

The A Deduction emphasizes that all experience occurs as modifications of inner sense, whose form is time. In what follows I'm giving a somewhat Heideggerian reading here, following Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. (H is criticized by R Makkreel in *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant* for taking liberties with Kant's text.)

So, for Heidegger, the following three syntheses are all temporal; note also how the imagination mediates sensibility and understanding. Imagination is the "common root" of S and U (B30). Actually, all the syntheses are functions of the Transcendental Imagination (A125), also called the productive imagination (A123).

The synthesis of apprehension in intuition (sensibility). This is the grasping of the manifold as one picture, after running through the manifold, distinguishing impressions by temporal succession and then holding them together as one manifold. As pure synthesis, we have here the constitution of the succession of now-moments; it constitutes the present.

The synthesis of reproduction in imagination. This is the retention of the series of the previous synthetic pictures. As pure synthesis, it binds the earlier to the now; it constitutes the past.

The synthesis of recognition in a concept (understanding). This is the unification of the apprehended and reproduced pictures in a judgment making sense of what is seen. This is a forecasting that allows the reproduced succession, the past bound to the present, to have a focus that is waiting for it as the form of unity of experience; it constitutes the future. (Remember here the phrase we talked about in Hume so much: "the understanding anticipates sight." The concept is a future focus which gets out ahead of sight, so that you see a unity that you've already seen; you re-cognize things as what they are through concepts.)

Finally, we need to mention the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, Kant's term for self-consciousness. All experience must be the experience of a subject that knows itself as a synthesizing subject. Thus the TUA and the categories mutually presuppose each other. Quoting from the SEP article on Kant: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/>

So self-consciousness, for Kant, consists in awareness of the mind's law-governed activity of synthesizing or combining sensible data to construct a unified experience. As he expresses it, "this unity of consciousness would be impossible if in the cognition of the manifold the mind could not become conscious of the identity of the function by means of which this manifold is synthetically combined into one cognition" (A108).

In the B Deduction Kant has a famous saying about the formal, a priori nature of the TUA: "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations."

SCHEMATISM

How can we bring sensibility and understanding together? How can pure concepts of the understanding – the categories – be applied to appearances?

Kant says we need a "third thing," the "transcendental schema," pure yet able to mediate the understanding and sensibility. They enable us to avoid the fate in which "thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind" (A51)

There must be some third thing, which must be homogeneous on the one side with the category, and on the other with the appearance, and which renders the application of the former to the latter possible. This mediating representation must be pure (that is, free from all that is empirical), and yet at the same time, and yet be intellectual on the one side, and sensible on the other. Such a representation is the transcendental schema. (B177)

A schema produces an image that that corresponds to a concept. We go from what we know to what we can see. The schema for a triangle, for instance, would be imagine three intersecting lines whose interior angles add up to 180 degrees. A schema is "a rule for the determination of our intuition, in accordance with a certain general concept" (B180).

The process, called "schematizing" is "an art hidden in the depths of the human soul" (B180). What produces schemata for categories? The transcendental imagination.

What does the transcendental imagination do in schematizing the categories? It determines time; the schemata are "transcendental determinations of time." B177. Why time? Time is a priori – the form of inner sense – and sensible, itself a "pure intuition." As for categories, they are just rules of synthesis (for instance, causality links two events as necessarily connected). How does time figure here? Rudolph Makkreel has a nice formulation:

The imagination schematizes by translating the rules implicit in the categories into a temporally ordered set of instructions for constructing an objectively determinate nature. The category of causality, for example, provides the rule for recognizing temporal order as a necessary order. This can be schematized by the imagination as a progressively temporal sequence through which objects can be determinately related. (*Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, p. 30)

Kant takes us through the four kinds of judgments: quantity, quality, relation, and modality.

The important ones for us today are substance and causality.

Substance is "permanence of the real in time." This is glossed as "the representation of the real as a substratum of empirical determination of time in general, which therefore remains while everything else changes" (B183).

Causality is "the real, which, once it is posited, is always followed by something else." In other words, necessary succession.

Kant summarizes: "The schemata, therefore, are nothing but a priori determinations of time." That is, in the case of relations, they are ways in which objects can be ordered in time: substance is the permanent substratum whose accidents change, and causality is the necessary succession of events.

Schemata are what rescue categories from being merely formal logical operations. So if you don't schematize substance, you just have something that is a subject for predicates and not predicated of something else. You can't represent an object that way; to have objects you need a way of determining time so that impressions appear in universal and necessary ways.

ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE

Substance and causality are taken up again in the "Principles" section, specifically the "Analogies of Experience."

The general framework of the Principles section is as follows. 1) The "supreme principle of analytic judgments" = non-contradiction. 2) The supreme principle of synthetic judgments = "every object is subject to the necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience." Those necessary conditions are the familiar triad of S, I, and U: forms of intuition (sensibility), synthesis of imagination, and TUA (understanding). Thus we get the following statement encapsulating the CPR: "The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience" (B197).

First analogy: permanence of substance. Changes occur in time, but time does not change; it is a pure form. Now time cannot be perceived (it's not an object of perception; it's what allows perception), so that which represents time as "substratum of all that is real" is substance (B225). So substance qua permanence is the background on the basis of which we can see change of "accidents."

Substance as permanence is not the logical understanding of substance as subject for predicates; instead, the permanent is to the altering is an "analogy" of substance and accident. The trick is to see substance, as permanence, as a mode of determining time. Thus we can understand "alteration," which is "a mode of existence which follows another mode of existence of the same object. Hence whatever alters remains, and only its state changes" (B230). This fits with Kant's project in the schematism: for us to have objective knowledge the categories have to be able to be applied to intuitions; this works by changing the logical function of judgment into time determinations.

Second analogy: Succession in time according to law of causality. Okay, so all alterations have permanence as their backdrop. Now we see that all alterations, when they are objective knowledge and not just flights of fancy, are experienced as subject to cause and effect.

We know that Kant wanted to have an account of causality that didn't depend on custom and habit, as did Hume's account. Causality is not a mental habit we build up by observing changes; it is a category that precedes and enables experience. But as a

category, it's just a logical function (ground and consequent); it has to be transformed by schematism into a time determination (the cause must always precede the effect).

Judgment	Category	Schema
Categorical S is P S belongs to class of P Relation of 2 concepts	Substance / accident	Permanence / alteration
Hypothetical If S, then P Ground / consequence Relation of 2 judgments	Cause and effect	Rule-bound succession First X (as C), then Y (as E) must follow
Disjunctive S or P	Reciprocity of Agent and Patient S is cause of P AND P is cause of S	Simultaneity of determinations of C and E

REASON

Kant talks of four faculties: sensibility (S), imagination (I), understanding (U), and reason (R).

We have seen how I mediates S and U. Sensibility is passive receptivity, understanding is active cognition, and imagination is temporal synthesis allowing mediation of S and U. This happens empirically in psychological perception, and that is made possible by transcendental forms: space and time are the forms of intuition (S), and the categories are pure concepts of the understanding (U), which, when schematized by the transcendental imagination (I) allow the categories to underlie empirical judgments.

Now we move to discuss Reason (R), which has several forms: speculative, critical, and practical. Critical reason frees space for practical reason to operate by restricting speculative reason from seeking a rationalist metaphysics that goes *beyond* experience.

Speculative reason (SR) is cursed with questions it must ask but cannot answer. SR has a rational metaphysics compulsion: it wants to produce knowledge from its three totalizing Ideas: God, world, and soul. Technically speaking, if left unguarded, SR will apply categories to the Ideas rather than to intuitions and in that way attempt to go *beyond* experience. It will want to *transcend* experience. But this desire is a "transcendental illusion."

Critical reason (CR) will come to the rescue and restrict the metaphysical urge to a metaphysics of experience: it will talk about what goes *before* experience rather than what goes *beyond* experience. The metaphysics of experience is immanent to experience; even though it goes before experience it doesn't transcend or go beyond experience. In a tricky terminological distinction, Kant calls the immanent metaphysics of experience "transcendental," while the rational metaphysics that goes beyond experience is called "transcendent."

So, the immanent metaphysics of experience will produce *transcendental* knowledge of space and time as forms of intuition, of the categories as pure concepts of the understanding, and of imagination as schematizing the categories to allow them to underlie empirical judgments. However the metaphysics of experience does not, by definition, go *beyond* experience; it is not "transcendent."

A key move by CR is to distinguish between the constitutive and regulative uses of the Ideas, thereby reining in SR from its rational metaphysical or "transcendent" claims.

CR shows, in the Transcendental Dialectic, that the constitutive use of Ideas – as objects to which the categories are applied – produces rational metaphysical claims that lead to insoluble conflicts. For instance, the Idea of the world as a totality can never be presented to the senses, and so application of the categories to the world-totality is an illegitimate constitutive use.

That leaves the regulative use of Ideas as guides to the empirical investigations of the understanding. The regulative use of the Idea of the world as totality, as coherent system of causal laws, allows for the continued investigations of the natural sciences. In other words, we must assume, ahead of time, that natural events are causally linked, even though we can never experience the totality of the natural causal order. The Idea of world-totality, in its regulative use, provides a horizon within which science can operate, even though, as with the physical horizon, it is ever-receding: you can never actually reach the horizon.

In its regulative use, reason unifies the employment of understanding just as the understanding unifies the sensible manifold.

Manifoldness of rules and unity of principles is indeed a requirement of reason, for the purpose of bringing the understanding into thoroughgoing coherence with itself, just as the understanding brings the manifold of intuition under concepts and thus brings intuition into connection. (B362)

IDEAS

Kant discusses Plato's notion of Ideas as that which transcends experience, yet forms the archetypes of experienced things. They are only able to be glimpsed by human reason, although we have a strong "erotic" pull to thinking them.

Kant proposes that there are three kinds of rational Ideas, corresponding to the unconditioned in the three forms of relation (categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive). (B380). The categorical corresponds to the subject, the hypothetical to freedom, and the disjunctive to God.

The categorical judgment has as its unconditioned the subject as that to which predicates are attached but is never attached to something else; this leads to the Idea of the soul.

The hypothetical judgment has as its unconditioned "the presupposition that presupposes nothing"; this leads to the Idea of the totality of the world as series of causes.

The disjunctive judgment has as its unconditioned that which enables a disjunction to be exhaustive; this leads to the Idea of God as the "system" or totality of all possible predicates joined in unity.

Each Idea has its characteristic metaphysical "science": rational psychology, cosmology, and theology. And CR diagnoses the insoluble problems of each: Paralogisms, Antinomies, and fallacious proofs for the existence of God. (B391)

The Ideas, we could say, are "problems without a solution" (B384), but that's exactly what enables them to serve as regulative guides to the always ongoing investigations of the understanding.

Judgment	Category	Schema	Ideas
Categorical S is P S belongs to class of P Relation of 2 concepts	Substance / accident	Permanence / alteration	Subject w/o predicate Soul Paralogism
Hypothetical If S, then P Ground / consequence Relation of 2 judgments	Cause and effect	Rule-bound succession First X (as C), then Y (as E) must follow	Series ending in a member w/o presupp. Antinomy
Disjunctive S or P	Reciprocity of Agent and Patient S is cause of P AND P is cause of S	Simultaneity of determinations of C and E	System w/o remainder God Ideals