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LSU HNRS 2030.2: "Evolution and Biology of Morality"

- I Chapter 1: The Interdependence Hypothesis
 - A) Parallels of natural and moral cooperation
 - 1) Natural cooperation
 - (a) Altruistic helping
 - (b) Mutualist collaboration
 - 2) Human morality
 - (a) Parallel human morality types:
 - (i) Altruistic helping via compassion, concern, benevolence: ethic of the good / sympathy
 - (ii) Mutualist collaboration via fairness: ethic of right / justice
 - (b) Simplicity vs complexity
 - (i) Sympathetic altruism is simpler and more basic:
 - (i) Pure cooperation
 - (ii) Proximate mechanisms: based in mammalian parental care / kin selection
 - (ii) Fair collaboration is more complex: interactions of multiple individuals w/ different interests
 - (i) "cooperativization of competition"
 - (ii) Proximate mechanisms: moral emotions / judgments
 - 1. Deservingness
 - 2. Punishment: feelings of resentment / indignation toward wrong-doers
 - 3. Accountability: judgments of responsibility, obligation, etc
 - B) Goal of the book: evolutionary account of emergence of human morality of sympathy and fairness
 - 1) Morality is "form of cooperation"
 - (a) Emerging via human adaptation to new social forms required by new ecological / economic needs
 - (b) Bringing with it "species-unique proximate mechanisms" or psychological processes
 - (i) cognition
 - (ii) social interaction
 - (iii) self-regulation
 - 2) Based on these assumptions, two goals:
 - (a) Specify how human cooperation differs from other primates
 - (b) Provide evolutionary account for how cooperation gives rise to morality
 - C) Starting point: great apes show
 - 1) Interdependence
 - 2) Long-term prosocial relations with other individuals: kin and friends
 - (a) These relations increase fitness
 - (b) So, they are invested in: grooming time, support in fights
 - D) Humans become ever more interdependent as we evolve, in two steps of collaboration and culture
 - 1) Forced by new ecological circumstances requiring obligate cooperative foraging
 - 2) Development of a cooperative rationality
 - (a) A plural-agent "we" based on shared intentionality
 - (i) At first, joint intentionality and second-person morality
 - (ii) Later, collective intentionality and group morality ("cultural" morality)
 - (b) Is the key push from strategic cooperation to genuine morality
 - E) First step: ecological change brings obligate cooperative foraging
 - 1) So, need to develop joint intentionality with a partner in foraging tasks
 - 2) Produces ideal image of what a partner needs to do: original shared normative standards
 - 3) Impartial in sense that they bind **any partner at all** to norms of behavior
 - 4) When you have partner choice
 - (a) This situation brings mutual respect and exclusion of free-riders

- (b) Thus: second-personal morality, a self-regulating “we” and its “oughts”
 - (i) Each would submit to be judged by norms of the “we”
 - (ii) Each could invoke those norms to hold partners accountable
- F) Second step: changing demographics of Homo sapiens @ 150Kya
 - 1) Fission / fusion of bands and tribes (“cultures”) competing with other tribes
 - 2) In-group loyalty / sympathy need collective intentionality / cultural norms
 - 3) Young humans are now born into pre-existing cultural settings producing norms and duties
 - 4) Now you get 3rd party observation, reward, and punishment
 - (a) You feel obligation to abide by and to enforce the norms
 - (b) And you know that others feel obligation to abide by norms and to punish your norm-violation
 - 5) We now have cultural or “objective” morality
- G) Results for contemporaries: we have three distinct moral stances
 - 1) Primate sympathy for kin and friends
 - 2) Joint morality of cooperation directed to specific people in specific situations
 - 3) Impersonal collective morality of cultural norms
- H) Ultimate vs proximate
 - 1) Ultimate evolutionary explanations / causes need not undermine morality
 - 2) Because they are separate from proximate decisions, values, and goals

II Chapter 2: Evolution of Cooperation:

Two axes of cooperation (helping, collaboration) and competition (power, domination, submission)

A) Foundations of Cooperation

- 1) Three Evolutionarily Stable Patterns of Cooperation: Based on Multi-Level Selection
 - (a) Kin selection:
 - (i) Level: genes
 - (ii) Proximate (psychological) mechanism:
 - (i) spatial closeness as kin detection
 - (ii) basis of sympathy: primates extend from kin to friends (allies)
 - (b) Group selection:
 - (i) Level: social groups
 - (i) Population structure is key for this if genes are to be basis of traits to be selected
 - (ii) Competition for resources provides selection pressure on groups
 - (ii) Mechanisms: Group identification (spatial closeness)
 - (iii) Later variant here: cultural group selection
 - (i) Does not need strict population structure
 - (ii) As it's not genes but social learning that develops traits for selection
 - (iii) So, there can also be selection for cultural learning facility
 - (c) Mutualism and reciprocity:
 - (i) Level: individuals
 - (ii) Types:
 - (i) Mutualism (both partners immediately benefit)
 - 1. Basis of many important aspects of human cooperative cognition / sociality
 - 2. Requires development of (and thus selection for capacities for) shared intentionality
 - (ii) Reciprocity
 - 1. Direct reciprocity of tit-for-tat kind
 - a. But as it involves time delay, then how did it start? Why take the chance?
 - b. Incentive to defect
 - 2. Indirect reciprocity: reputation
 - (iii) Mechanisms: (De Waal model)
 - (i) Calculated reciprocity: implicit “contract”: seems to be rare in non-humans
 - (ii) Emotional reciprocity: more common in mammals: sympathy for kin and friends
- 2) Interdependence and Altruism
 - (a) Formal theories assume atomized individual competition to pass on genes

- (b) This is valid on one perspective but is incomplete and neglects proximate mechanisms
 - (c) For complex social creatures:
 - (i) There are multiple types of social relations (competitions and cooperations w/ diff time scales)
 - (ii) There is interdependency as well
 - (i) So, helping and cooperating is “not a sacrifice but an investment”
 - (ii) And I would add that it is directly pleasurable
 - (iii) Classic reciprocity models
 - (i) Miss interdependency;
 - (ii) Stakeholder model captures it as symmetrical / deferred
 - (iv) Mutualism: symmetrical and immediate: mutual dependence discourages cheating
 - (d) Stakeholder / interdependence models build benefits into cooperation w/o requiring payback from beneficiary
 - (i) Emotional reciprocity is proximate mechanism here
 - (ii) Not proximately motivated by previous specific acts
 - (iii) But has goal of maintaining relationship
 - (i) JP: again, there must be a pleasure here
 - (ii) or at least relief from anxiety of isolation
 - (iv) This is symbiosis: individuals seeking direct fitness benefits from relations
 - (v) We don't have origin issue here, but still face free-riding problem
 - (vi) Altruism thus becomes natural and not improbable (“mutual aid” as per Kropotkin)
- 3) Partner Control, Partner Choice, Social Selection
- (a) Partner control: punishment of non-cooperators
 - (b) Partner choice: avoidance of non-cooperators and alliance with other cooperators
 - (c) Social selection:
 - (i) Emerges from both mechanisms (generalization from sexual selection)
 - (ii) Almost any trait can be selected but here we are interested in cooperation
- 4) Summary
- B) Great Ape Cooperation
- 1) Sociality and Competition
- (a) Although chimps and bonobos have different behaviors
 - (b) They both cognize for competition (“Machiavellian intelligence”)
 - (c) And exercise self-control
 - (d) Recognize fear, anger, surprise, and disgust in others
- 2) Cooperation for Competition
- (a) Behaviors:
 - (i) Inter-group defense
 - (ii) Intra-group
 - (i) Coalition-forming for status / dominance
 - (ii) Behavioral means for such alliance-forming
 - 1. Reciprocity
 - 2. Affiliation
 - a. Grooming
 - b. Food sharing
- (b) Mechanisms
 - (i) Emotional more than calculated reciprocity
 - (ii) Direct positive emotional bonding with kin and friends
 - (iii) Mutual sympathy relations rather than agreements or sense of fairness
- 3) Collaboration for Food
- (a) Most primates forage alone, and this is their main survival process
 - (b) But, some chimps collaborate in hunting monkeys, as non-essential but desired treat
 - (i) But this is “individualistic coordination”
 - (ii) Not true “we” of joint intentionality
- 4) Sympathy and Helping

- (a) Natural observation unable to establish altruistic motivation
- (b) Recent experiments show instrumental helping, probably to establish / maintain alliances
- (c) There might be some sympathetic motivation: Grooming and food sharing increases oxytocin
- 5) No Sense of Fairness:
 - (a) No studies on retributive justice (“eye for eye” punishment)
 - (b) Distributive justice
 - (i) Ultimatum game: no rejection of unfair offers (contrast with humans)
 - (ii) Social comparison of rewards: no evidence in Pan
 - (iii) No evidence of resentment at unfairness
 - (i) Though maybe “social anger” at poor rewards indicating lack of sympathy from friend
 - (ii) This could be step on way to resentment
- C) Kin- and Friend-Based Prosociality
 - 1) Competition even when interdependent is balanced out
 - (a) Competition for immediately valuable resources (food and mates):
 - (i) Dominance and coalitions in zero-sum game
 - (ii) Motivated by sympathy to allies but in context of competition
 - (iii) Thus, social selection for dominance and fighting ability
 - (b) cooperation in meat-hunting: “missing link” on way to human obligate collaborative foraging
 - 2) Portrait of LCA in terms of prerequisites for human morality
 - (a) Cognition:
 - (i) Individual intentionality for decision-making
 - (ii) Understanding intentions of others
 - (b) Social motivation
 - (i) Form long term social relations of dominance and friendship and to recognize alliances
 - (ii) Basic emotions, including “social anger” and ability to recognize these in others
 - (iii) Intentional communication
 - (iv) Sympathy-based motivation to help others instrumentally, esp. kin and friends
 - (c) Self-regulation
 - (i) Control impulses for prudential reasons
 - (ii) Collaborate with others to produce new resources: inhibit impulse to chase prey individually
 - 3) Middle theoretical position
 - (a) Some are skeptics that primates have any prosocial feelings or other-regarding preferences
 - (b) Others hold that apes have roots of human morality (De Waal)
 - (i) Sympathy
 - (ii) Reciprocity as forerunner of fairness and justice
 - (c) Tomasello sees apes with sympathy but their reciprocity is not forerunner of fairness
 - (i) Emotional reciprocity is just complex sympathy
 - (ii) Fairness requires more than just sympathy
 - (i) Two insights from Hume
 - 1. Sense of equality structuring the social interactions: but this is missing in ape dominance
 - 2. Need for interdependence
 - a. Chimps and bonobos are dependent
 - b. But can individually obtain survival resources
 - (ii) So, how did humans become interdependent w/r/t obtaining survival resources?
 - 4) Conclusion:
 - (a) LCA was “somewhat prosocial, in context of intragroup competition”
 - (b) We retain this but have built upon it, moving beyond sympathy for kin and friends to obligation

III Second-Personal Morality

- A) Intro and forecast
 - 1) New ecological / economic condition of early human obligate collaborative foraging
 - (a) If we use chimps as model, LCA could cooperate in hunting but that wasn't essential to survival
 - (b) Early humans (from 2Mya to 150Kya)

- (i) Starts with contractarian cooperation (opt-in when it's individually advantageous)
 - (ii) Evolves to contractualist cooperation: second-person morality
- 2) Forecast:
 - (a) Expansion of sympathy
 - (b) Early morality of fairness
 - (i) Cognitive processes of joint intentionality: forming a "we" agent
 - (ii) Social-interactive processes of mutual respect and deservingness
 - (iii) Self-regulation and joint-self-regulation
- 3) Child developmental: up to 3 years, human children have 2nd-person morality but not yet group morality
- B) Collaboration and Helping
 - 1) Self-domestication: three intertwined processes; soon after Homo emergence 2Mya
 - (a) Mating via pair bonding: recognition of paternity leading to less indiscriminate aggression
 - (b) New subsistence strategy: scavenging; selection against bullies and for sharing (Boehm)
 - (c) Collaborative childcare (Hrdy)
 - 2) Obligate Collaborative Foraging: crucial step, after eco-change; 2Mya, first Homo species
 - (a) Large-game hunting
 - (b) Need good sharing system
 - (c) Allows partner choice and hence social selection for collaborators
 - (d) Partner control here as well: change behavior of poor collaborators
 - 3) Concern for Partner Welfare
 - (a) Expansion of sympathy beyond kin and friends
 - (i) Concern for economic partners pays direct dividends in mutual aid scenarios
 - (ii) Multiple goals at multiple time scales
 - (b) Proximate mechanisms of concerned helping show up in human children
 - (i) highly motivated to help others
 - (ii) internal motivation with no need for external incentives (in fact reward, then stop, produces less help than if no rewards were ever started)
 - (iii) "human helping is mediated by a sympathetic concern for the plight of others."
 - (c) Interdependence is evolutionary basis even if sympathy is not calculated reciprocity
 - (i) pupil dilation shows children equally satisfied when they help someone or if he is helped by others; this shows reciprocity cannot be evolutionary basis for young children's helping as that would require the self helps the other person, not simply that they are helped by anyone
 - (ii) children look out for the well-being of the other when distress is justified by situation; so we're not motivated to let ppl get what they want, but by what they need.
 - (iii) children more likely to help others when in context of collaborative activity; children help more those who have been previously harmed;
 - (iv) this is Smithian empathy, "taking her perspective and putting oneself in her shoes"
 - 4) However, this is not yet morality of fairness, which requires three steps
 - (a) Cognitive processes of Joint intentionality
 - (b) Social-interactive processes of Second-Personal Agency
 - (c) Self-regulatory processes of Joint Commitment
- C) Joint Intentionality
 - 1) Dual-level Structure of Joint Agency: individual perspectives on joint activity
 - (a) No one loses individuality
 - (b) Gain perspective on role interchangeability
 - (c) Three aspects
 - (i) I as collaborative partner
 - (ii) You as my collaborative alter ego
 - (iii) We as joint agent
 - 2) Collaborative Role Ideals
 - (a) Role-specific ideals but also universal role ideals (effort, perseverance, sharing)
 - (b) These are instrumental and local, but no longer merely individual
 - (c) Hence, they are "socialization of individual instrumentality"

- (i) Develops from joint agent “we”
 - (ii) Both partners realize success affects “I,” “you,” and “we”
 - (iii) Specifies what the here-and-now partners should do as well as what any partner should do
- 3) Self-Other Equivalence
 - (a) Birds-eye-view of the joint activity implies exchangeability of roles, hence self-other equivalence
 - (b) Not yet a moral judgment, but a move from strategy (contractarian) to impartial contractualism
 - (c) Via partner choice, early humans now on the way to mutual respect
- 4) Summary
- D) Second-Personal Agency
 - 1) Partner Choice and Mutual Respect
 - (a) Identifying good partners and avoiding poor partners
 - (b) Early humans recognize that others are evaluating them as well
 - (c) So, there are various “marketplaces” for partners, varying by information
 - (d) Pre-language, gossip would not be possible, so limited information markets for partners
 - (e) So, we see mutual respect of equal partners
 - 2) Partner Control and Mutual Deservingness
 - (a) Avoiding free-riders: excluding them from shares
 - (b) That means birth of “deservingness”
 - 3) Cooperative Identity
 - (a) Two arenas: in the joint action, but also in larger pool of potential partners
 - (b) Social identity from web of foraging partnerships
 - (c) Personal identity from self-reflexive judgment of deservingness
 - (d) Leads to second-person address with respect and recognition
- E) Joint Commitment: you can only feel obligation to a supra-individual “we” to which you have agreed to submit
 - 1) The Original Agreements
 - (a) Explicit mutual acknowledgement of joint commitment requires cooperative identity
 - (b) Second-person address renders common knowledge of role ideals and action commitment explicit
 - 2) Second-Personal Protest
 - (a) Joint self-regulation = agreement that each can sanction other for role failure
 - (b) Children complain of unfair division of rewards:
 - (i) Resentment on failure to be shown respect
 - (ii) This is partner control backed up by threat of partner choice
 - 3) Dividing the Spoils Fairly
 - (a) Toddlers will share spoils of collaboration
 - (b) Indicates sense of deservingness; based on respect
 - 4) Second-Personal Responsibility and Guilt
 - (a) Two conditions for moral obligation in cooperative contexts
 - (i) Treating partner with respect
 - (ii) Identification with joint “we” yields personal identity or “I as partner”
 - (b) Hence, we are beyond strategic reputation-management into “socially normative self-regulation”
 - (c) So, second-person guilt is self-judgment on this ideal cooperative role basis
 - (d) Leads to attempts to repair damage to joint commitment
 - (i) Both positive attempt to live up to ideal
 - (ii) And negative attempt to preemptively limit liability
 - (e) Second-person responsibility and guilt:
 - (i) “First socially normative attitudes of human species”
 - (ii) Resulting from “internalization of resentful 2nd-personal protest”
- F) The Original “Ought”: 2nd-personal agreements bequeath essential elements of human morality
 - 1) Early Human Moral Psychology
 - (a) Psych adaptations to new life of obligate collaborative foraging
 - (b) Three formulas
 - (i) You > Me: sympathetic helping toward partners (emotional)
 - (i) Expansion beyond just kin and friends

- (ii) Self-benefit here ultimately, but proximately sympathetic motivation
 - (ii) You = Me: Early form of ethic of fairness (cognitive)
 - (i) Self-other equivalence from logic of joint intentionality
 - (ii) Requires mutual respect and sense of deservingness
 - (iii) Allows control of free-riders via criticism and exclusion from spoils
 - (iii) We > Me: acknowledging obligation to the “we” of joint commitment (self-regulation)
 - (i) Cooperatively rational (strategic to cooperate, or contractarian)
 - (ii) Mutual respect beyond strategy (contractualist: based on actual agreement)
 - (c) Cooperative rationality here is “ultimate source” of obligation
- 2) Can There Be a Purely Second-Person Morality?
 - (a) Joint intentionality eliminates specter of moral solipsism
 - (b) However, the role ideals from 2nd-person joint commitments are temporary and local
 - (c) So, we do not yet have 3rd-party intervention (which we only get with culture, as in next chapter)
- G) Pages 76-77: summary table on human children in 4 areas, showing second-person connection but pre-group cultural normativity. This represents earlier stage in morality evolution. It allows for parental input as part of normal ontogenetic pathway.
 - 1) Joint intentionality and cooperative communication
 - 2) Reward division
 - 3) Partner choice and partner control
 - 4) Joint commitment

IV “Objective” Morality:

- A) Intro: scaling up from collaboration to culture.
 - 1) From local and temporary joint (2nd person) intentionality, commitments, and self-regulation
 - 2) To universal (in-group) collective intentionality, commitments, and self-regulation
 - 3) Four time periods
 - (a) Primates: sympathetic helping of kin and friends and strategic self-regulation
 - (b) Early humans, from 400Kya to 150Kya (second-personal morality of sympathy and fairness)
 - (c) Modern humans, from 150Kya to 10Kya (cultural groups)
 - (d) Contemporary humans, from 10Kya on: post-agriculture (cities and states: multicultural mixing)
- B) Culture and Loyalty: demographic pressure and geographical circumscription
 - 1) Similarity and Group Identity
 - (a) Group structure
 - (i) fission / fusion of bands and tribes;
 - (ii) assumes tribes in hostile resource competition with other tribes
 - (iii) JP: I think this begs question; there are inter-tribe relations but they need not always be hostile
 - (b) Conformity and group identification (collective pride / guilt; cf Kelly on feud vs personal vengeance)
 - 2) In-group Favoritism and Loyalty: selective helping of in-group; scaling up on following three capacities
- C) Collective Intentionality (cognitive)
 - 1) Conventionalization and Cultural Common Ground
 - (a) Once you are past direct acquaintance, you need signs of in-group identity to be able to assume common knowledge, skills, attitudes, beliefs, emotional triggers, etc
 - (b) Once you are there, then you can assume agent-independent role norms for in-group members
 - 2) Conventionally Right and Wrong Ways to Do Things
 - (a) Instruction here is generic and authoritative: “one must do it this way”
 - (b) And backed historically: “we have always done it this way”
- D) Cultural Agency (social-interactive)
 - 1) Social Norms:
 - (a) Collectivization of collaborative norms and norm-enforcement
 - (b) Three immediately prudential reasons for norm-conformity
 - (i) Establish identity as in-group members
 - (ii) Coordination with other group members
 - (iii) Avoid punishment (direct and indirect via bad reputation)

- (c) But not just prudential conformity; there's also identification with group and norms, as evidenced by 3rd party punishment (which isn't prudential, unless there is good 2nd-order enforcement as when you are punished for not noticing and punishing norm-violations)
 - 2) Cultural Institutions
 - (a) Explicit rules and institutions reduce transaction costs by establishing expectations
 - (i) Searle and social facts
 - (ii) Durkheim: tendency to sacralize norms and institutions, so taboos on violating them
 - 3) Cultural Agency and Identity
 - (a) Assumption of cultural identity
 - (b) Universality of in-group norms
- E) Moral Self-Governance
 - 1) Collective Commitment and Guilt
 - (a) Collective and not just collaborative "we"
 - (b) 2nd-order judgment: did you punish non-conformity?
 - (c) Guilt: retrospective judgment that previous judgment was faulty (JP: this underplays *akrasia* or weakness of the will)
 - 2) Moral Identity
 - (a) Proximate moral judgments
 - (i) Not just prudential self-interest or strategic reputation management
 - (ii) But from sense of self as moral agent who affirms collective norms
 - (b) Four concerns forming "core moral identity"
 - (i) Me: self-interest
 - (ii) You: sympathetic helping
 - (iii) Equality: self-and-other equivalence
 - (iv) We:
 - (i) Dyadic collaboration
 - (ii) Group cultural "we"
 - (c) Contemporary dilemmas involve tensions among these concern
 - (d) Reactions
 - (i) Violation of equality: resentment
 - (ii) Violation of sympathy: hurt feelings
 - (iii) Violation of norm: disapproval
 - (e) Self-justifying narratives (cf. Haidt) aim to preserve moral identity
 - (i) This is sometimes made easier by othering victims
 - (ii) But there can be ingenious rationalizations
 - 3) Distributive Justice
 - (a) Modern humans share resources with in-group members, though with some contemporary differences
 - (b) Cultural upbringing on top of "natural" second-personal morality
 - 4) Cultural Group Selection
 - (a) With modern humans (and especially with increased demographic pressure / geographic limits) you can get cultural group selection
 - (b) Annihilation, displacement, assimilation into "successful" groups
- F) The Original Right and Wrong
 - 1) Modern Human Moral Psychology
 - (a) Identification and Loyalty
 - (b) Legitimization
 - (c) Moralization
 - 2) Multiple Moralities
 - (a) Many moral logics, but they all must appeal to 2nd-personal morality of sympathy and fairness
 - (b) Cultural conformity and inertia, but also creativity and moral entrepreneurs (p. 134)
- G) Coda: After the Garden of Eden
 - 1) Post-agriculture we get lots of changes
 - 2) In-group hierarchies and exploitations and coordination devices of

- (a) Law: p. 131 is too self-congratulatory on role of law
 - (i) It needn't be simply moral legitimacy
 - (ii) Nor raw power
 - (iii) But middle ground enforcement of hierarchy through property law, state monopoly on force, etc
- (b) Religion
 - (i) Justification of existing structures
 - (ii) Reinforcement via omniscient and punitive gods (Norenzayan)
 - (iii) Durkheim and sacralization of social structure and norms
 - (iv) Haidt: disgust at norm-violation along with purity aura of norm-following
- H) 120-21: summary table on "preschool children's nascent norm-based morality." From 3 to 5 they are not yet fully moral but they have advanced beyond toddlers (as summarized in III.G above [p. 76-77]).
 - 1) Collective intentionality
 - (a) Understand everyone in group has shared cultural knowledge
 - (b) Feel responsible for bad acts by any in-group member
 - (c) Tendency to divide resources (and not just rewards) equally
 - (d) Allow for unequal division of resources from fair procedure
 - (e) Respect ownership of others
 - 2) Social norms
 - (a) Intentionally punish 3rd-person harm
 - (b) Verbal enforce 3rd person norms
 - (c) Prefer norm enforcers
 - (d) Teach and enforce norms with objective language "that's wrong"
 - 3) Collective commitment and obligation
 - (a) Avoid conflict via coordination conventions for everyone
 - (b) Sometimes resist peer pressure in order to do right
 - (c) Feel guilty only for personal caused harm or in-group harm and feel responsible to make amends
 - (d) Prefer those who show guilt

V Human Morality as Cooperation-Plus:

- A) Intro:
 - 1) Two steps from apes and two forms of moral psychology
 - (a) Second-personal
 - (b) Group-cultural
 - 2) Similar evolution process
 - (a) Ecology changes
 - (i) No more individually obtainable foods
 - (ii) Population growth and geography pressure
 - (b) Increases in interdependence and cooperation
 - (i) Obligate collaborative foraging
 - (ii) Tribal group formation and cultural competition
 - (c) Coordination of new forms of cooperation
 - (i) Cognitive skills of shared intentionality (joint, then collective)
 - (ii) Social-interactive skills of cooperative competence (second-personal, then cultural)
 - (iii) Social self-regulation (joint commitment, then moral self-governance)
- B) Theories of the Evolution of Morality
 - 1) Three categories
 - (a) Evolutionary ethics:
 - (i) Theoretical principles of cooperation
 - (ii) Lots of work on reciprocity, but some recognition of sympathy
 - (iii) MT feels reciprocity is limited in explanatory power and interdependence is much better focus
 - (b) Moral psychology
 - (i) Proximate psychological mechanisms
 - (ii) Haidt is major figure:

- (i) Focus on fast acting intuitions
 - (ii) Multiple moral logics
 - (iii) Relies on group selection
 - (iii) Rand and Greene: Type I and Type II processes
 - (iv) MT feels these folks focus too much on fast / intuitive and not enough on rational deliberation
 - (c) Culture
 - (i) Cultural anthropology emphasizes diversity of moral codes
 - (ii) Richerson and Boyd point to cultural group selection
 - (i) This would apply selection pressure to ability to conform and culturally learn
 - (ii) (See here Henrich's *Secret of Our Success*)
 - (iii) Gene-culture co-evolution and strong reciprocity
 - (iii) MT replies
 - (i) Culture cannot explain species-wide basis for forming cultural norms
 - (ii) MT's account is more comprehensive
 1. Emphasizes two-step process
 - a. First dyadic cooperation
 - b. Then group / culture
 2. Tied to changes in ecology
 - a. Obligate collective foraging with partner choice
 - b. Population / geography pressure: tribal group formation and inter-group competition
 3. Human moral psychology is cooperative rationality
 - a. Joint intentionality / commitment (2nd-personal)
 - b. Collective intentionality / commitment
- C) Shared Intentionality and Morality
 - 1) Recap:
 - (a) Great apes
 - (i) Instrumentally rational with some sympathy to kin and allies
 - (ii) Chimpanzee and bonobo meat-hunting is not really cooperative
 - (b) Early humans
 - (i) New ecological circumstance: obligate collective foraging / cooperative rationality
 - (i) Strong interdependence
 - (ii) Sympathetic concern for potential partners
 - (ii) Cognitive skills of joint intentionality: "I" and "you" make "we" so we have sense of partner equivalence
 - (iii) Social-interactive: partner choice: mutual respect
 - (iv) Self-regulation: joint commitment to regulate collaborative activity via impartial role ideals
 - (c) Modern humans
 - (i) Ecological circumstance: population growth and geographic limitation
 - (ii) Cognitive: collective intentionality / cultural common ground / impartial view of world
 - (iii) Social-interactive: social norms and institutions / born into objective facts and values
 - (iv) Self-regulation: moral self-governance as adherence to moral identity via adoption of group norms
 - (v) Cultural group selection
 - 2) Interdependency hypothesis is the key
 - (a) Reciprocity does not really explain human moral psychology
 - (b) Interdependency does as it makes individuals caring for and helping others a natural part of human life
 - (i) Distinguishing ultimate (evolutionary) and proximate (psychological), we can see their juxtaposition in "mistakes"
 - (i) Strategic-adaptive self-interest
 - (ii) Moral-adaptive: sympathy motive with unknown adaptive payoff
 - (ii) But morality can also be seen via rational assessment of human evolutionary circumstances
 - (i) Cognitive skills of shared intentionality
 - (ii) Allows the "moral-structural" aspects
 1. Second-personal

- a. Social-interactive: mutual respect as “moral-structural”
 - b. Self-regulation via commitment are also “moral-structural”
 - 2. Collective / group capacities
- D) The Role of Ontogeny Two stages of child development, mirroring phylogeny. Includes parental input, but with evolved preparation.
 - 1) 1-3 years:
 - (a) second-person morality, but not yet “social norms as shared expectations of ‘our’ social group.”
 - (b) Clue is that there is sympathy and fairness but no 3rd party norm enforcement.
 - (c) Cross-cultural similarity here.
 - 2) 3-5 years:
 - (a) beginning group morality.
 - (b) Specific content of cultural rules from parental instruction, socialization practices, and peers.
 - (c) “Key finding”:
 - (i) more authoritative parenting leads to less internalization and more strategic norm-following;
 - (ii) more “inductive” styles which provide reasons, lead to internalization and moral self-regulation.

VI Conclusion

- A) *Homo economicus* is a specific adaptation to a specific situation, not some natural starting point
 - 1) It is true most organisms (which are very simple) act in ways that adaptations
 - 2) But socially complex organisms have more flexible behaviors
 - (a) Certainly they do act aiming at their own self-interest at times
 - (b) But there is plenty of evidence of genuine non-self-interest sympathetic helping, even in children (actually, sometimes this is the clearest way to see it, before it gets trained out of us by capitalist life)
- B) MT’s account is that developed morality is based in “natural” second-person morality
 - 1) But this breeds conflict among multiple moral demands which require rational adjudication if time allows
 - 2) Egalitarian forager bands beat the Enlightenment call for mutual respect to the punch by thousands of years