

PREFACE

1. Theme of self-knowledge and its difficulties

2. N is writing a polemic on the origin [*Herkunft*] of moral prejudices. His first thoughts are found in *Human, All-Too-Human* [where he shows that actions that some attribute to divinely inspired moral commands are explicable by naturalistic hypotheses]. N mentions his will to knowledge that lies at the root of his thoughts.

3. N's early theological writings on origin [*Ursprung*] of good and evil evolve due to his desire to look for worldly explanations of morals: historical, philological and psychological taste lead him to these questions about moral judgments: a) their conditions; b) their value [*Werth*]. Concerning value for life: are they signs of distress or of plentitude and force? [Here we see a real key: the diagnosis or interpretation of moral judgments as signs of a type of life. N as physiologist.]

4. N's antipathy to Rée's book and references to other N works.

5. Return to the question of the value of morality as superior to hypotheses about origin [*Ursprung*]. Relation to Schopenhauer and the value of pity. [Excellent article by Martha Nussbaum in Schacht volume on "N's Stoicism": pity as harmful both to subject and object: the pitier assumes worldly goods are worth worrying about; this increases fear of loss and desire for revenge when they are taken away. The pitied is assumed also to be concerned about these things and to be unable to overcome their loss and still maintain flourishing. Nussbaum accuses N of "bourgeois" toughness: he can overcome loneliness and alienation while living on a pension in various resorts, but cannot appreciate the way real deprivation destroys the physical basis for flourishing. You can display spiritual toughness by thinking despite a migraine, but one simply cannot overcome the limited brain growth caused by chronic malnutrition, fatigue, and repetitive menial labor. Thus N isn't as good a physiologist as we are when we notice this.]

6. The problem of the value of pity leads to demand for a new critique, a critique of values of moral values, with regard to the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, evolved and changed. [Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy* posits N as rewriting Kant's critiques. For Kant, critique set forth the universal and necessary conditions and limitations of rational knowledge, delimiting science, morality, and aesthetics/biology. {See also Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*.} Nietzsche wants to show the earthly conditions and value for life of the limited set of moral judgments previously occurring here on Earth]. N's motivating question: What if the highest power and splendor of man was held back by the triumph of morality?

7. N proposes an actual history of morality, which must be accomplished by genealogy, that is, attention to the documented moral judgments (but these are in need of interpretation) of mankind. Rée's hypotheses are those of a reader of Darwin: that is, a domesticated herd animal. [See Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Viroid Life*, for the Nietzsche / Darwin connection.]

8. N and the art of reading.

ESSAY 1: "GOOD AND EVIL," "GOOD AND BAD" [ON *RESSENTIMENT*]

1. The "English psychologists" [Locke and Hume] are the only other ones to attempt a naturalistic analysis of the origin of morality. What is their motivation in showing habit and association and other humble mechanisms at the basis of what others assume are the glories of human reason? Are these just displays of petty rancor toward the other-worlders? N hopes they are instead "fundamentally brave, proud, and magnanimous animals For such truths do exist." [Note the courage needed for self-knowledge as well as the plurality of truths: both strong Foucaultian themes.]

2. But their historical spirit is lacking .

A). They make a fundamentally non-genealogical mistake. They take their own contemporary value judgments about the utility of actions to the recipient of the action and project them backwards to the alleged origin. History for them is then thought to be the smooth development of this essential kernel, with only minor changes in appearance: that is, one forgets the utility aspect of other-helpful acts and simply names the act good in itself. For N, this picture of essence / accident in history betrays the subject / property grammatical error that haunts metaphysics. [There are endless nuances to the history of metaphysics, but one of the closest matches to N's complaint might be found in the theory of "predicables" in A's *Topics*, where we see a subject with various types of predicates: some denote its *essence* {its *definition* and *genus*}, others *differentiate* it from others in its genus, some denote *necessary properties* {which do not define the subject, but nonetheless always accompany it as a *unique property*}, still others denote *accidental properties*. The relation of this doctrine to Aristotle's *Categories*, and in turn to the *Metaphysics* is more than enough to occupy a good scholar's career.] For N, becoming is fundamental: there is no essence that develops through changing appearances: there is only the changes.

B) N claims that the "good" ones, the noble ones, first applied the term to themselves. This self-naming is part of the overflowing fullness of their life and power: they seized the right to create values from the pathos of distance they felt separating themselves from the common herd. N stresses that the feeling of superiority is much too intense, much too hot, to have anything to do with the cool calculation of utility.

3. N's second objection to the English hypothesis: how can the forgetting of utility work? Spencer seems more likely (though not true): goodness simply means utility.

4. N's clue is the etymology of words, wherein he sees the same conceptual transformation: "noble" in the social / political sense becomes "good" in the valuing sense, while "common" in the social sense becomes "bad" in the valuing sense.

[I don't think this is yet a morality, if morality is a universalizable injunction. IOW, the nobles aren't saying that everyone, slaves included, should be noble; they are only saying that what they, the nobles, are, is good.]

5. An important nuance in naming derived from the feeling of superiority: the names are often simply about power, but also about a character trait: the truthful. (The commoners are often the "cowards.")

N here gets into his race theory. Immense difficulties. The main question: does N consistently apply genealogical thinking in analyzing the production of strength and

weakness in the conqueror (fair-haired) and suppressed (dark-haired) races? Or does he lapse into a reified metaphysical notion in which there is a subject endowed with the property "strength" or "weakness"?

Dan Conway, one the leading contemporary interpreters of Nietzsche wrote the following in personal correspondence when I asked for his help in getting out of the quandry we had gotten into on the notion of race in Nietzsche:

N uses "race" in both a descriptive and prescriptive (honorific) sense. In the former sense, "race" is roughly equivalent to nation, people, etc. In the latter sense, "racehood" is earned over time, by means of centuries or even millennia of sustained acculturation. The "races" that he praises are praised because they are self-fashioned and self-regulated. The model here is the "Greeks" of the tragic age, who comprise any number of ethnicities from the greater Mediterranean-Adriatic-Ionian region. In short, a "race" in the prescriptive sense is made, not born. As a consequence, the only meaningful sense of "racial purity" pertains not to "blood," but exclusively to the institutions of acculturation that are responsible for the self-fashioning of the race. To "breed" a race is to impose upon a loose aggregate of peoples, tribes, nations, etc. a single principle of order and organization. This is why N hates the anti-Semites, who believe that racehood can be earned and maintained merely by attending to one's mating partners (i.e., blood descent).

At the bottom of all this is some kind of quasi-physicalist ontology of forces. The role of the great leader or lawgiver is to impose order onto a chaotic welter of peoples and tribes.

The bottom line: For N, "race" is far closer to what we would call "culture" than to biological or genetic ancestry/destiny. "Blood" is a huge red herring, simply because after centuries of poor acculturation, even "blood" can be affected.

I replied to Dan:

We were indeed confusing "strength" as an individual predicate (or better the relation of a particular constellation of forces in what we call a human body), which would be susceptible to class analysis (monopoly of good diet and so forth) and the strength of a race as the intensity of self-formation, the organization of customs toward the goal of self-overcoming (i.e., what sends the Athenians all over the Aegean to build monuments to their good and awful deeds, as N quotes Pericles). In other words, confusing individual physiology with cultural politics. But in one sense the imposition of order on customs is backed up by individual physical force (culture is formed at the point of the sword), but it's important to keep the levels distinct in principle. The confusion of course comes from N using physiological language to discuss cultural politics. And behind all that too, as you rightfully point out, is the ontology of forces. I tend to follow the Deleuze line and think of that ontology as underlying both N and the Foucault of the *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality 1* period, (although with a complexity theory spin: power as ability to influence conditions of other people's actions = power as ability to pattern the phase space or in Deleuze terms to carve up the virtual realm).

6. A key materialist thesis: claims to the superiority of soul stem from claims to political superiority. When the politically superior class is the priestly class, then “purity of soul” at first simply meant purity of bodily practice.”

N here begins his examination of the “priests.” They tend to be “unhealthy,” which keeps them from action, forcing them into brooding and emotional explosions, which leads to “intestinal morbidity and neurasthenia.” The priestly remedy for this [the ascetic ideal] has been terribly dangerous to mankind in fostering nihilism. But we can’t forget that only the priests make man an interesting animal: only with them does the soul acquire depth.

7. N opposes the health of the warrior nobles and the sickness of the priests. Priests are dangerous because they are physically impotent, which makes them devious haters by blocking immediate reaction to slights. N here identifies the Jews as the “priestly people” par excellence.

[Yirmiyahu Yovel’s article in the Schacht volume makes the following distinctions in N’s evaluation of the Jews. N is filled with admiration for both the Old Testament and for contemporary European Jewry. The first for their grandeur; the second for their toughness and self-overcoming. They are the keys to the advancement of Europe. The “Jews” as priests are the Second Temple priests, those overcome by the Romans. It is this period of Jewish history, that feeds into [Pauline] Christianity [not Christ himself as a personal figure], that is N’s target here.]

The Jewish priests concoct the most spiritual revenge: the revaluation of noble values. This is the slave revolt in morality.

[NB: the priests lead this revolt and give shape to the dissatisfaction of the slaves. “Slavishness” in N means the spirit of revenge, not any mere political/economic condition. I think there’s a way this is the birth of morality qua universalizable injunction. Prior to the priestly intervention, there was only a conflict of noble and slavish valuations, but these weren’t moralities, bcs they weren’t universalizable injunctions.]

8. Jewish hatred is itself extremely powerful: it creates ideals and revalues values, giving birth to Christian love, the path to Jewish victory over Rome [cf. the Second Essay].

9. The monologue of the “free spirit.” The free spirit is a democrat: he applauds the slave revolt for having led to modern democracy. He doesn’t like the Church (as it’s anti-modern) but only because it’s too slow at spreading the “poison” of egalitarianism. But at least the free spirit is honest enough to see morality as disguised politics.

10. The slave revolt in morality is due to the creativity of *ressentiment*, which gives birth to slave values. Noble valuation is active and self-affirmative [“I am good, therefore {an afterthought} those others are bad”], while slave valuation is reactive and other-negating [“The powerful others are evil, therefore I am good.”].

[Here Deleuze is essential in distinguishing active and reactive. Even though priests are creative and powerful, they base themselves on the reactivity of the slaves.]

Ressentiment is a matter of physiology: the active are those whose happiness is found when strength is manifested in action, while the reactive are those who need rest for happiness. *Ressentiment* breeds cleverness in the weak, while it is immediately consummated and extinguished

in the strong. The nobles do not “forgive and forget”: rather they forget so quickly and thoroughly that they have no need to forgive. Thus the nobles can revere their enemies rather than hate them: they love a good opponent as the occasion to manifest their strength.

11. The nobles are kept in check *inter pares*, but when they “go outside” they are like beasts of prey, like “blond beasts,” [Kaufmann is essential here in identifying the blond beast with the lion, not with the Aryan] such as the Romans, Arabs, Germans, Japanese, Greeks, Vikings. [The felt superiority of the pathos of distance is a surplus of differential force that is discharged when in the presence of the weak: it is like a discharge across a membrane due to a difference in charge on either side.] The *Sinn* [“meaning” but also “direction” as in the vector of force] of culture is the reduction of the noble warrior beast to the tame man of society. Thus *ressentiment* is the instrument of culture, for it is through *ressentiment* and the priestly leadership of the slave revolt that revalues noble values that this taming has occurred. [The mass of weak individuals is stronger than the few strong ones.]

12. Interlude in which N expresses his disdain with the cultivated modern tame social being. [The problem of modernity and social production: what diets {Mintz, Schivelbusch}, what “structures of feeling” {Raymond Williams}, what disciplinary institutions {Foucault} are needed for co-operation?].

13. The “good” as conceived by the man of *ressentiment* is the “strong” man who does not act, who “freely chooses” not to act. This is based on an illusion: that there is a subject separate from action which is free to act or not act. For N, this is due to the “seduction of language” [the subject-predicate structure of Indo-European languages]. Thus the weak have taken their necessity of not acting and made it a virtue. “I could have done that, but I didn’t want to, I chose not to.” Hence the “truth” of the free subject is just the lie told for the self-preservation of the weak herd.

[This is the origin of slave morality as opposed to simply slave valuation. Only here is the injunction “be good [i.e., non-noble] universalizable, that is, applicable to the nobles as well.]

[Can we turn the tables on N with regard to reification, in this case, the “strength” of the “noble races”? Is “strength” itself blown up into a property of a subject, in this case, the “noble race”? If so, this mystifies the production of strength through diet and exercise, which are social practices restricted to the sons of the nobles, by attributing strength to some hereditary carrier like “blood.” It could be that N falls into the typical philosophical trap of neglecting child-rearing practices. Plato sees precisely this problem of racializing strength and its concomitant nepotism in demanding communal child rearing in Book 5 of the *Republic*. A rigorous genealogical analysis of strength would point to its *production* in the conflict of forces.]

14. The glimpse into the workshop for the production of values.

15. The rewards for the Christian faithful in the afterlife.

16. The mark of the higher nature today: that the struggle of noble and slave systems of morality is an internal, spiritual struggle. [An important sentence to destroy any lingering doubts as to whether N harbors any nostalgia for the days of the warriors.] Rome vs Judea. The Renaissance and the Reformation. The French Revolution. Napoleon. All seen as exemplifications of these types. The interpretive question: which force is stronger in these events? What type of life is exemplified?

17. N's note. Future studies of the history of morality will have to follow his lead in utilizing etymology, philosophy, physiology, and medicine in investigating the value of morality with regard to a) survival of greatest herd number; b) production of a stronger type.

[Ansell Pearson locates here a key point in the relation of N and Darwin: natural selection as elimination of difference by stressing adaptation versus a creative profusion of internal differentiation that merely uses the environment as a testing ground for its experimentation. See also Richardson.]

ESSAY TWO: "GUILT," "BAD CONSCIENCE"

1. Breeding an animal with the right to make promises; the problem of forgetting as an active faculty: the protection of consciousness from unconscious processes of experience and absorption. This active forgetting is necessary to make room for new experiences and for happiness in the presence. The man who cannot forget cannot be happy, bcs he dwells on past slights which leads to brooding about future revenge. [Deleuze here compares N and Freud on forgetting, cness, and the uncns in topographical terms: sensitive membranes and so forth.] [N elsewhere talks about forgetting as the repression of difference in making concepts.] Man must breed a memory in the case of promising, making himself calculable, regular, necessary.

2. The origin [*Herkunft*] of responsibility is the making of men regular [note the production process: the plasticity of "man"]. This is a prehistoric labor of culture as such, of the "morality of custom," which involves severity, tyranny, stupidity, and idiocy.

The fruit of this prehistoric [generic] process is the "sovereign individual": autonomous and with right to make promises, conscious of what has preceded him [the prehistoric labor of overcoming forgetfulness]. The awareness of his responsibility is what the sovereign individual calls "conscience."

[I have my doubts whether nomadic foragers related to their myths and traditions as "commands" as Nietzsche would have it. I would think they were guides to be followed closely when possible, but that innovation and improvisation would be fine when needed. In other words, there was always judgment as to how to apply the custom to the case in front of the group. That's what group discussion was all about. And the wisdom of the elders could never just be sheer mechanical obedience to custom seen as law.

["Prehistoric" does not mean "before" but rather "out of history." Deleuze p. 133 shows that this prehistory is the generic training of obedience to law as such, in principle separate from the arbitrary content of positive laws. In any case, this is a very important theme for post-structuralism: consciousness as cultural product produced by work on the body.]

NB: do not confuse the sovereign individual of Essay Two with the noble warrior of Essay One.]

3. How did culture produce the sovereign individual? Through a "fearful mnemotechnics": only pain can overcome forgetfulness. This is the origin of asceticism [see Essay Three for the "ascetic ideal"].

Asceticism here means self-working. Clue is ancient punishments. An important quote: "Ah, reason, seriousness ... at the bottom of all 'good things.'"

4. Previous genealogists have missed two important factors: The origin of the [moral, psychological] notion of guilt in "very material" concept of debt. The independence of punishment from notions of free will, which come much later in history. Punishment was for the most part of history only the venting of anger at the cause of an offense. But this venting is held in check by the notion of equivalence: that pain caused by an offense can be paid back by pain dealt out in punishment. The origin of this equivalence is the contract between creditor and debtor.

[Free will involves the slave morality diremption of force from what it can do and the creation of the illusion of the subject: 1.13. Note the tracing back of psychology to political economy. DG use circulation of debts as way to critique "exchangist" anthropologies in *Anti-Oedipus*.]

5. The payback for the pain of an offense is the pleasure caused by the infliction of pain on another. The pleasure is greater the lower the creditor is in social hierarchy. The pleasure can come merely from watching the infliction of pain.

[N here sets up mercy as the privilege of the strong, the self-overcoming of justice. We also see how the question of "thanatography".]

6. Morality traced back to legal codes organizing political economy. N underlines that this is a conjecture, and that it is painful to investigate here. Revenge is not an appropriate investigative concept here Cruelty as festival. Spiritualization of cruelty in higher culture.

[N's notion that investigation is painful plays against any idea that he is nostalgic for the olden times. Revenge is part of *ressentiment*, a much later specific cultural moment; creditor / debtor relations and the pleasure in causing pain are part of the "prehistoric" or generic training of consciousness in man.]

7. Earlier days were more cheerful when cruelty was festive. This insight is no grounds for contemporary pessimism, which is the shame at man, the result of a "morbid softening and moralization." Today some use suffering as an argument against existence, but in the past it was a seduction to life. The problem these people feel is the senselessness of suffering. One solution is to have the gods be friends of cruel spectacles [the Trojan War as festival of the gods]. Modern notions of "free will" are precisely to keep God interested in the "drama of salvation" and hence save Him from the boredom of a deterministic universe.

8. Rendering equivalent as thinking as such

[cf. forgetfulness as repression of difference in formation of general concepts: this is also N's critique of what he sees as "Darwinism": the triumph of the herd, the molar.]

This primitive creditor / debtor economic thought is prior to any social organization. In equivalence is the beginning of justice: equal powers reach an understanding of equivalence in offense / punishment, and compel lesser powers to quit squabbling and reach a settlement.

[Graeber blows this all to pieces. Debt is completely bourgeois, aiming at isolation and equality: once the debt is paid the parties are equal and can walk away. It's definitely post-

State, not pre-State. But that's not how "human economies" of obligation and relation work, not even today in day-by-day life. Can you imagine a neighbor who won't borrow your lawnmower but insists on renting it? What kind of asshole would do that, just so he won't have an obligation to be friendly, to continue in a neighborly relation with you? Who is so afraid of a promise to help you when you need it?]

9. "Prehistoric" equivalence / justice here defined by N as everywhere present. Thus community is to citizen as creditor to debtor. Punishment is then a reminder of what credit the community has extended the citizen in terms of protection, peace, etc. A law-breaker is then thrown outside the community; now hostility can be vented upon him as upon an enemy defeated in war.

10. The more powerful the community, the less seriously it takes offenses. The more powerful community now protects its law-breakers from mob violence and from revenge and insists that it is the agent that will determine equivalence / justice. To treat acts as dischargeable and hence to separate the criminal from the crime: the mark of the strong community. The endpoint: a community so strong and conscious of its strength that it lets its parasites go unpunished. The self-overcoming of justice in mercy.

11. Repudiation of attempts to find origin of justice in resentment (which today is found flourishing in the anti-Semites and anarchists). Contrasting biological value of reactive and active affects. Contra Dühring, the triumph of justice is the overcoming of revenge: objectivity even to those who have harmed you: this is contemporary mastery. Law is the struggle against reaction and revenge: the active impose boundaries and limits on the thirst for revenge of the weak and reactive by a) protecting the criminal; b) by making justice the struggle against the enemies of peace, not the search for revenge; c) by imposing settlements; d) by elevating equivalents into norms; e) most importantly, by instituting law, so that violence against persons is now an offense against the sovereign power. All this leads to the impersonal evaluation of crime, the opposite of revenge.

Essence of life is will to power [to creativity through change and self-overcoming; as Deleuze insists, we cannot see the will to power as the will of an unchanging subject that wants the power it lacks: this is precisely the slave's view of things], so law is exceptional condition: the partial restriction of individual wills to power in order to create a greater unit of power, the community. Law is a means in the struggle between powers [forms of life: the active struggle against the reactive by imposing justice as a form for their reactive forces], it is not aimed, nihilistically, at the preventing of struggle [which would be the prevention of creation and change].

12. The principle of functional indeterminacy is the key to genealogy. That is, current function is no clue to origin [the mistake of the "English psychologists"], since the history of anything is the history of its being seized by greater forces and put to a new task, a new function, which obliterates the previous function. Thus any final cause (that the purpose of a thing dictates its origin) is an illusion. Purposes and functions are only signs of being used by a will to power; the history of a thing is arbitrary and contingent. This is even the case with organs within an organism: degeneration and death are the conditions of progress. The doctrine of will to power is foreign to contemporary herd tastes, which would rather see the mechanistic senselessness of events than acknowledge will to power. The current emphasis on "adaptation" and "survival" mistakes a reactivity, an afterthought, for the primacy of form-giving forces. Survival adaptations are secondary to endogenous creativity of form. [All this is involved with the discussions of mechanisms of variation and selection in evolutionary biology. Ansell Pearson, *Viroid Life*, is the key reference.]

NOTE ON WILL TO POWER: Deleuze insists will is not the property of a subject, nor does it seek a power that it lacks. [The subject is the illusion fostered by resentment so the weak can feel virtuous; lack is what traps desire.] Power is the relation of forces to each other. The will is just the event of a certain configuring of forces. Just as forces can be active or reactive, power can be affirmative or negative. Just as forces must be interpreted [put to use by stronger forces], power must be evaluated. Its lowest, negative form is the priestly seeking to dominate others {the slaves they organize and also the real target, the defeated noble warriors} by organizing the reactive forces of *ressentiment* and bad conscience and thereby organizing the herd. Because priests organize the slave revolt, their "mastery" is slavish to the core, devoted to the defeat of their rivals, the noble warriors. The highest form of will to power, by contrast, is affirmation of self- overcoming creativity, the giving of new form to active forces.

NOTE ON WILL TO POWER AS BIOLOGICAL THEORY: some remarks from my review of *Viroid Life* [Parallax 8 (July-September 1998), 156-58.]: Despite what one might have expected, Ansell Pearson shows that "Nietzsche's position 'contra' Darwin is flawed ... what is decisive is the critical perspective Darwin's thinking on natural selection brings to bear on Nietzsche's *Lebensphilosophie*, [which] rests on an untenable anthropomorphization of nature, life, and evolution" (86). ... Nietzsche's contribution to biological thought should come from his emphasis on endogenous, "form-creating" forces, an emphasis-- taken up in contemporary complexity theory--which counters Darwinism's overestimation of utility in meeting the survival challenge of exogenous forces. Nietzsche falters in his desire to avoid anthropomorphism, however, Ansell Pearson charges, in his biologizing formulation of will-to-power as a "basic organic function" (Beyond Good and Evil), which is then used, in Ansell Pearson's phrase, "to legitimize an aristocratic radicalism" (106). This move of Nietzsche amounts to nothing more and nothing less than that for which he criticizes the Darwinians: projecting social forces onto nature, and then reading back off of that "nature" a social and political philosophy! The key remedy, Ansell Pearson states, is to produce a non-anthropomorphic reading of will-to-power so as to "map non-human becomings of life" (109). Ansell Pearson approaches this task first through a critique of Heidegger's readings of Nietzsche that seek to outlaw reflection on Nietzsche's biology, and then with a call for a "technics of excess, in which the inventiveness of evolution would be seen to exceed a utilitarian calculation, so making possible the becoming of more complex, non-linear, and 'machinic' models of evolution" (114).

13. Applying the genealogical category of functional indeterminacy to punishment, N writes that the custom endures but the meaning, the purpose, is fluid. Bodies have been beaten and tortured long before the function of "punishment" was given as interpretation of those actions. Meanings [functions] are in fact hopelessly concentrated in anything with a long history; only that without history is definable. Long list of different functions of punishment.

14. Punishment is thus overdetermined by all sorts of functions, all sorts of uses. In fact, the one thing we can be sure punishment does not do is awaken a feeling of guilt in the one punished, which is supposed to be its essential contemporary function. Punishment doesn't make you feel guilty, but toughens you up or destroys your vitality. Actually, punishment prevents guilt, as the punished one cannot see violence, lying, theft, etc as such as reprehensible, since the state is in the process of dealing out violence to him, after having bribed, cajoled, threatened the witnesses! Actually, the punished one doesn't feel guilty, but unlucky.

15. Punishment mostly served to increase prudence, not guilt. It tames man, rather than making him “better.”

16. What then is the origin of bad conscience, the feeling of guilt? The enclosure of man in the walls of society and peace. Unable to rely on instinct, they had to rely on their weakest organ, consciousness. When instincts are not discharged outward, they are internalized. This internalization of instinct is the origin of bad conscience. This new internalized man is a new thing on earth, something that needs the creation of divine spectators.

17. Two presuppositions of this hypothesis. A) it was a sudden break. B) the “state” as imposition of form on the raw material of the population [note the hylomorphism] is the sudden act of the noble warriors who install a terrible tyrannical machine. The state-builders as commanders do not form a contract with the people, but are artists molding them, organ-izing them [organon = tool], rendering them functional parts of a greater whole, giving them a *Sinn* [meaning, direction: providing a vector of force]. Bad conscience does not develop in these artists, but they provide the necessary condition for it by providing a social organization that restricts the action of the masses and hence internalizes their instincts.

18. The creation of the bad conscience is the same creative force, but on the small scale of the internal soul. The will to power vents itself not on an external population, but on the internalized ancient animal instincts of man now trapped in society. The active bad conscience, the joy of making one’s own self suffer, is the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena. This is a hint towards how self-denial can become an ideal [the ascetic ideal examined in Essay Three].

19. To see the high point of bad conscience we have to go back the creditor / debtor relation, seen as the obligation to ancestors. Fear of ancestors increases as power of tribe increases. Thus the most powerful tribes have ancestors that become gods. Piety only with the noble tribes.

20. The guilty feeling of indebtedness to the divine reaches its height with the Christian God. Thus with the advent of the reverse course [the death of God], the feeling of guilt should decrease as well. Atheism and second innocence.

21. Up to now N has ignored the moralization of the concept of guilt and bad conscience. Thus we won’t be free of bad conscience so easily; it won’t die just with the death of God. The moralization of bad conscience is an attempt to prevent the discharge of guilt by turning the indebtedness back against the debtor so that the irredeemable debt gives rise to the idea of the irredeemable penance, to eternal punishment. But they are also turned back on the creditor: our ancestor, Adam, is guilty too – of original sin, as is nature, or existence – now considered worthless, until finally we see the masterstroke: God himself sacrifices himself for our guilt, rendering it infinite: how can you repay someone who freely took your guilt on himself and punished himself for you, out of love?

22. Thus self-torture [bad conscience as the will to hurt yourself now that in society you can’t freely hurt others] reaches its highest peak: projection onto God of the antithesis of animal instincts so that he feels guilty for his own animal instincts as rebellion before this perfect, loving God. Here we see the will to feel guilty beyond repair; this is the bestiality of thought that erupts when man cannot be a beast in deed. All this is sad and terrible, especially the connection of this will to guilt with love.

23. Hence the “holy God.” But there are other uses for gods: consider the Greek gods, the reflections of noble and autocratic men, the deification of the animal in man. These gods served the Greeks as warding off the bad conscience. [Principle of functional indeterminacy applied to the gods.] The Greek gods thought men foolish, not evil. In fact they served a true noble purpose: as the origin of evil in men through madness they took on themselves not the punishment for man [which would only insure infinite guilt and eternal punishment] but the guilt.

24. The present situation and hopes for the future.

25. But only Zarathustra the godless can speak of this future man.

ESSAY 3: “WHAT DO ASCETIC IDEALS MEAN?”

1. N presents a variety of meanings of the ascetic ideals (AI), each one for a different group. The key categories, all of which are treated in the 3rd essay, except for women: a) artists [sections 2-4]; b) scholars and philosophers [sections 5-9]; c) women; d) “physiological casualties” (the majority of people); e) priests ; f) saints. N ends this section with the famous line with which ends the 3rd essay: because the will needs an aim or target, man would rather will nothingness than not will. [Conway notes that N does not define AI here. He proposes the following: AI gives meaning to life to those who deny themselves physical pleasures by promising extra-worldly rewards; it degrades and poisons the enjoyment of physical pleasures.]
2. As an example of AI and artists, what did AI mean for Wagner’s late turn to chastity and rejection of sensuality? There need not be an antithesis btw chastity and sensuality; even when there is, it can be a charm to life to negotiate this balancing act, but only for “the best and brightest.” With “pigs that have fallen on hard times,” who are made to praise chastity, they will only praise it as the opposite of themselves. It’s this opposition that Wagner stages at the end of his life. Why?
3. It would have been better if Parsifal had been a joke, a comic satyr play in which Wagner takes leave of tragedy by producing an exaggerated parody of the tragic. That would have been evidence of Wagner’s strength: his ability to laugh at himself. If we see Parsifal as straightforward, it’s just evidence of Wagner cancelling himself as an artist who once wanted his art to be “the highest intellectualization and sensualization [*höchste Vergeistigung und Versinnlichung*].” The young Wagner followed Feuerbach’s dictum of “healthy sensuality”; the late Wagner seems to have renounced it all and turned to ascetic Christianity.
4. A truly aesthetic outlook must renounce physiological inquiry into the artist if it is to enjoy the work of art. But N, as “physiologist and vivisectionist of the soul” must continue on that path. Artists often consider themselves identical to their creations, but this is false: they are always different from them, and that difference is the condition of creation.

5. But artists aren't that interesting in this investigation; they are never independent, but always just the "valets of a morality or a philosophy or religion." So we need to move from Wagner to Schopenhauer, on whom W relied, lacking the courage to himself develop an ascetic ideal like the one S developed. So a better question is: what does it mean when a real philosopher like S pays homage to the AI? First, let's look at S on art, which is what first attracted W to him, and caused him to change his view of music, from a means that needed a goal (drama) to flourish, to a sovereign form of art, the independent form of art, that speaks the language of the will in direct revelation. Now the musician seems a "sort of mouthpiece of the 'in itself' of things, a sort of telephone to the beyond ... ventriloquist of God" talking metaphysics.
6. Schopenhauer departs from Kant, who sees the aesthetic problem of beauty from the perspective of the spectator rather than from that of the creative artist. But that leads to the mistake of conceiving the beautiful as that which gives pleasure w/o interest. [Stendahl, on the contrary, called beauty the promise of happiness, as expectation of satisfaction of interest / desire.] Now Schopenhauer could never break free of Kant's standpoint: for S, aesthetic contemplation counteracts sexual interest: it's an escape from the will [desire as lack that can only temporarily be sated before beginning anew]. So really, S's interest in art is the interest in being released from the torment of his intense sexual desires. Generalizing from S's case, we see that philosophers turn to AI as a means of freeing oneself from torture.
7. Don't feel sorry for the perpetually angry Schopenhauer: his anger at "Hegel, women, sensuality" is what kept him from pessimistic suicide, kept him interested in life. S is just an extreme case of two characteristics of philosophers: a dislike for sensuality and an adherence to AI. Here N gives a key statement of will-to-power as biological principle: "every animal ... instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable conditions in which to fully release his power and achieve his maximum of power-sensation [*Machtgeföhl*]." And every animal "abhors" that which blocks this path; thus every philosopher abhors marriage as blocking his independence. Hence the philosopher's predilection for the AI as the "optimum condition of the highest and boldest intellectuality [*Geistigkeit*]." So the AI for a philosopher is not the denial of existence in general, but the affirmation of his existence in particular. [Conway emphasizes that for N, the philosopher instinctively embraces the AI as an instrument to their own enhanced spiritual power, but this means they might make the conceptual mistake of endorsing the AI in itself.]
8. On to a portrait of the philosopher using the AI to achieve the best conditions for spiritual power. Three principles are at stake: poverty, humility, chastity. This section is often seen as a flattering self-portrait of Nietzsche himself, especially the line about "a room in a crowded, run-of-the-mill hotel." What's important is the notion of self-directed asceticism as condition of spiritual productivity.
9. Philosophy needed the AI to begin, for philosophical drives and virtues were contrary to morality and conscience for a long time, insofar as they are expressions of strength rather than weakness. Our contemporary life is one of hubris toward nature, God, even ourselves; indeed "all good things [as judged today] used to be bad things at one time; every original sin has

turned into an original virtue." For instance, marriage (as one man's monopoly of a woman); gentle, sympathetic feelings; submission to law: all these were violations of the "morality of custom," which is the "decisive main historical period that determined man's character." During the morality of custom, suffering, cruelty, deceit, revenge, denial of reason were all virtues; well-being, curiosity, peace, compassion were all dangers; being pitied and work were disgraceful; madness was godlessness; and change was unethical and ruinous. [Conway: now that the philosophical virtues are respectable, has philosophy outgrown its dependence on the AI? See the coda to section 10.]

10. Contemplative men aroused suspicion during the long pre-history of the morality of custom; to survive, they had to arouse fear in others, and even in themselves. Their tool was that cultivation of self-mortification, through which they could violate tradition and form new practices. So philosophers as contemplatives have had to hide among the already established contemplatives – the priests, magicians, soothsayers. So the AI was the disguise for philosophers under the desperate conditions of their long pre-history. Can the philosophical butterfly now emerge from the loathsome caterpillar of the ascetic priest?
11. We can tackle the main problem of the meaning of the AI now that we have encountered the ascetic priest (AP). We'll have to help him mount a defense of the AI, as he obviously lacks objectivity here. So what is the valuation of earthly, sensual, power-striving life by the AP? They degrade it as only a bridge to another existence, as a wrong path, or a mistake. The negative valuation of life by the AP is very common in human history; the AP "does not belong to any race in particular; he thrives everywhere, he comes from every social class." N then develops a key concept: "life itself must have an interest in preserving such a self-contradictory type" as the life-hating form of life that is the AP. An ascetic life is self-contradictory: it is a life in which *ressentiment* rules, in which will-to-power pushes for a mastery over life, rather than over something; paradoxically, power seeks to block the [biological, physiological] sources of power; power targets the manifestation of physiological power in growth, beauty, joy, and finds satisfaction in failure, decay, pain, etc. The paradox is that ascetic power grows as the condition, life, decreases [IOW, you have to be alive in order to hate life].
12. A philosophical embodiment of ascetic self-contradictory life would look to deny what is most real and truthful: sensuality and one's ego, one's reality. [We have to be careful here, as N upholds a "society of the self" thesis: there's always a multiplicity of drives at work and our experience of a unified self is only that of the triumphant drive.] We even see reason turned against itself, in the positing of an inaccessible realm of the in-itself. But we shouldn't be ungrateful for this ascetic training of the spirit that develops the desire to see differently, for that is the condition for future "objectivity." This is not the "view from nowhere" but the ability to play multiple interpretations off against each other; the more angles we can see from, "the more affects we can put into words," the better our "concept" or "objectivity" will be. [Bringing affect and cognition together like this is a very hot topic today in the "embodied mind" school of thought.]

13. But in reality, a self-contradiction like “life against life” makes no psychological or even physiological sense: it’s only a shorthand that indicates previous ignorance. N knows the real cause; the AI “springs from the protective and healing instincts of a degenerating life.” The AI doesn’t ultimately aim at death, but at the preservation of a form of life: the sickly human. The AP puts himself at the head of the flock of sick humans and lets them maintain their hold on [earthly] life [by making their suffering meaningful as preparation for rewards in the after-life]. What is the source of the sickness? The futurity of man, his experimentation, his courage and richness: how could such an uncanny animal not be sick?
14. N delivers an inspired rant at the way the sick have made the healthy feel ashamed for being healthy. This is the will-to-power of the weak, to tyrannize the healthy. The worst of these physiological casualties, eaten alive by their own resentment, are the anti-Semites. But this is all topsy-turvy: the healthy should be kept separate from the sick so that the healthy can prepare man’s future. Otherwise, blending nausea and pity / compassion only risks nihilism.
15. The AP, as a sick physician to sick people, has an historic mission as the defender of the herd. He is in fact a more deadly predator, because of his cleverness, than the merely physically strong warriors. Now in protecting the herd, he must manage the herd’s *ressentiment*; he can’t let them envy the healthy, for he must despise, delicately, all direct expressions of strength such as those displayed by the healthy. To prevent a dangerous explosion of *ressentiment* [revolution], the AP changes the direction of *ressentiment*. Now all sick suffering people seek someone to blame for their suffering, because such blaming, as a powerful emotion, anesthetizes pain; this anesthetizing is the “physiological causation of *ressentiment*.” The amazing trick of the AP is to convince the sick herd that they themselves are the cause of their suffering; they are the ones to blame.
16. So guilt, sin, etc are attempts to make the sick harmless, to turn their *ressentiment* back on themselves; for the less ill among them, this is “for the purpose of self-discipline, self-surveillance, and self-overcoming.” Now this can’t be a real physiological cure, but it did at least organize the sick (in “churches”) and keep them separate from the healthy for a long time. Now sin is not a fact, but an interpretation of the fact of physiological upset. N proposes a physiological reduction of psychological suffering, in the sense that strong people digest their experiences while weak people suffer from indigestion (i.e., *ressentiment*). But N is still an opponent of “materialism” [for N, that = “mechanism” and is wrong bcs it denies will-to-power as universal metaphysical / ontological principle, even in inorganic “matter”].
17. The AP treats only symptoms (pain) rather than causes (weakness, sickness). He uses emotions to combat the depression, fatigue, and melancholy of the sick. He’s a psychologist trying to cure a physiological problem, which might be caused by mixing races or social classes, by unsound emigration, by bad diet, by disease. So the AP must fight lethargy. N then details the methods and forms of this fight. The first method is to reduce awareness of life to its lowest point: no more desire, no emotions. This hypnotizes man, like hibernation; this can result in conquering depression, and often in spiritual visions / hallucinations, and even in “salvation” as “state of

total hypnosis and silence." The false "spiritual" / ascetic interpretations of the religious are to be noted, but at root the methods of the AP are, unwittingly, interesting though superficial experiments ("hypnosis"), although the emphasis on "deep sleep" and release from suffering reveals the desperate sickness being combated.

18. More common than the use of "hypnosis" in fighting depression are two methods. The first method is the use of repetitive work, "mechanical activity," which distracts the sufferer from his pain. Giving meaning to the work they have to do anyway succeeds with slaves, whose discontent was not invented by priests, even though priests take them in hand, organize them, and offer them "cures." Another method is a small dose of pleasure, frequently the pleasure of giving pleasure to others by helping them; this is an arousal, in small doses, of life-affirming will-to-power by allowing the helper to feel superior to the helped. We see this in the mutual aid societies of early Roman Christianity; this testifies to the formation of a herd as a manifestation of will-to-power and a victory over depression. Belonging to a herd can free a sick person from his dissatisfaction with himself; the AP senses this desire and promotes it; "the instinct of weakness has willed the herd and the cleverness of the priest has organized it." The strong seek to be apart just as the weak seek to be together; a group of the strong is in view of collective expression of will-to-power and is against the conscience of the individuals; a herd, on the other hand, forms for the pleasure of togetherness. Associations of nobles are unstable due to the solitary nature of the individuals; every oligarchy is threatened by desire for tyranny.
19. Besides these "innocent" means of fighting depression, the AP has other, "guilty" means, involving an excess of feeling, which is a great anesthetic. This is incomprehensible to moralized ears, but Nietzschean psychologists will need to resist moralization to undertake effective genealogies. The problem with modern moralists is their innocence, not so much their lies. In the future, this 19th C innocence will be used as an emetic! It's N who will have the courage to utter a few truths about man.
20. Back to the issue at hand: the AI used to produce an excess of feeling as a means of freeing man from depression. Now this just makes the sick even sicker, but remember that the AP is not a physiologically adept physician; he's just trying to keep humanity from a mass suicide. The main tool of the AP is the feeling of guilt; in Essay 2 we found the bad conscience (cruelty turned on the self when it's impossible to release outward due to social life); now we realize that's only the raw material for the AP as artist, who turned animal bad conscience into guilt over sin. The AP taught man that he was to blame for his own suffering because he was a guilty sinner; his suffering was punishment for his sin. In this way depression is overcome and life became interesting again: the guilty sufferers cried out for more ways to suffer.
21. The cost of the AP's prescription of the AI as antidote to depression has been very high. It has tamed the healthy man, while it has made the sick even sicker. Plus, the sickness of guilt is virulent; it spreads widely and quickly. It provokes "shattered nervous systems," epidemics of "epilepsy" like St Vitus's Dance; depressive towns; witch hunts; sleep walking; death worship. It has been a disaster for the health of Europeans. [Conway: the spread of the sickness of guilt is

the priests' weapon against the nobles.]

22. The AP has also ruined literary taste; witness the New Testament. Leaving aside classical Greco-Roman antiquity, it can't even compare to the Old Testament, which has "great men, heroic landscape ... strong heart; ... a people."
23. N can't keep listing the effects of the AI, for they are endless. Instead, we are after the meaning of the AI. It aims at denigrating this world in favor the after-life, but what is the counterpart to the AI? What has affirmation of this world as its goal? Is it modern science? Well, it's atheistic at least, but in fact, it is only the latest manifestation of the AI! In fact, don't we see all sorts of workaholic, self-anesthetizing scientists?
24. Even with the idealist philosophers and scholars we still see evidence of a lingering domination by the AI. They are not really free spirits, because they still believe in truth as affectless "objectivity" (compare 3.12 on multiple affects). These idealists still have faith in a metaphysical value of presuppositionless "objective" truth. Even today's atheist scientists are closet Platonists in their belief in the divinity, the other-worldliness, the "objectivity" of truth. What N proposes is something new: posing the problem of the value of truth, a critique of the will-to-truth.
25. No, science is not the place to find new values; only philosophy posits new values. [Conway: perhaps N is after a new science freed from the AI and subservient to a philosophical positing of values after the critique of the value of truth.] Contemporary atheistic science only denies the outward theological trappings of the AI; it's related closely to the AI by its shared overestimation of truth as immune to critique or evaluation. In fact, art, as fundamentally illusion is more opposed to the AI than science is, so when art supports the AI it is in fact artistic corruption. Physiologically, science rests on the same impoverishment of life as the AI; witness the solemnity and decadence of scholarly epochs. In fact, the anti-theological naturalization of man via science, his being rendered an animal [Darwin] lost in the stars [astronomy], all this points to the self-contempt of man characteristic of the AI. Kant is a great clue: he frees the transcendental God [as postulate of practical reason] as soon as he outlaws the metaphysical God.
26. Modern scientific historiography is no better; it is ascetic too insofar as it appeals to a supposedly presuppositionless "objectivity." No, more than ascetic; it is nihilistic. But even worse are the "contemplative" historians of today such as Renan; even the vulgar anti-Semites like Dühring are preferable! At least the AI is honest and believes in itself! N continues with a rant against the desolation of the modern German spirit, caused by "an almost exclusive diet of newspapers, politics, beer and Wagnerian music."
27. N repeats his charges: modern science lacks a counter-ideal; its atheism binds it even stronger to the AI by stripping away outdated theological trappings and allowing the core allegiance to unquestionable truth to hold sway. Modern atheism is just the end point of a 2000 year

discipline in truth-telling, which ends by denying the lie that is the belief in God's existence. In fact, it is Christian morality's own insistence on truth-telling that results in modern atheism, which is nothing but the self-sublimation [*Selbstaufhebung*] or self-overcoming [*Selbstüberwindung*] of Christian belief, thus instantiating a veritable law of life. The same self-sublimation or self-overcoming of Christian belief must now occur for Christian morality; we stand on the threshold of this event. So the meaning of our existence [N and his readers] is that the will-to-truth has now become conscious of itself, has now posed itself as a problem. This becoming-problematic of the will-to-truth will destroy morality; "that great drama in a hundred acts reserved for Europe in the next two centuries, the most terrible, most questionable drama but perhaps one most rich in hope ..."

28. The AI has served a great purpose: it has preserved man from suicidal nihilism by giving a meaning to his suffering. Suffering is not a problem; meaningless suffering is the problem. The AP and AI mean that man would rather will nothingness [the afterlife is nothing compared to this world] than not will.