NOTES ON *BEING AND EVENT* (PART II)

PART II: BEING: EXCESS, STATE OF THE SITUATION, ONE/MULTIPLE, WHOLE/PARTS, OR $\in$ / $\subset$?

MEDITATION 7: THE POINT OF EXCESS

1) Belonging and Inclusion
   A) Set theory is a "foundational interruption" of ontological disputes.
      I) Traditionally, there have been 2 couples and many inter-relations
         (1) one / multiple [*un/multiple*] & whole / parts [*tout / parties*]
         (2) e.g, Plato has the One prevail over the All [*l'Un sur le Tout*], and Aristotle the opposite
      II) Set theory suppresses both relations
         (1) The multiple is thought w/o unity or totality
         (2) However, AST distinguishes two types of relations btw multiples
            (A) Belonging = $\in$ = multiple as element of another multiple
            (B) Inclusion = $\subset$ = multiple as "part" or "sub-multiple" of another multiple
   B) Consequences of this distinction
      I) "Ontological neutrality": elements and parts / subsets are still pure multiples
         (1) Power-set axiom: all multiples included in a set belong to another set
         (2) IOW, you can count-as-one all "internal multiple-presentations" that were "already possible" in the initial presentation
      II) Belonging is the only relation
         (1) Inclusion can be defined in terms of belonging
         (2) So the term "part" does NOT imply a "whole"
      III) The power-set is a new multiple
         (1) Set of multiples belonging to a set just is that set
         (2) Set of subsets of a set is a new set
      IV) The gap [*écart*] between set and power-set = "point in which the impasse of being resides" [*le point où gît l'impasse de l'être*].
      V) Operational distinction of belonging vs inclusion (not 2 different ways to think the multiple)
         (1) A set is a structured presentation; it has a count-as-one
         (2) A power-set is a "metastructure"
            (A) It is "another count"
            (B) It gathers together
               (I) All the inclusions
               (II) All the "sub-compositions of internal multiples"
      VI) The metastructure of a power set "counters the danger of the void"
      VII) Gap btw set and power-set is "a permanent question for thought"
2) The theorem of the point of excess (power-set is immeasurably larger than the initial set)
   A) Demonstration via Russell's paradox that a power-set necessarily contains a multiple that doesn't belong to the initial set
      I) Preliminary definitions:

(1) Multiples that do not belong to themselves = ordinary multiples
(2) Multiples that do belong to themselves = evental multiples
II) Ordinary subset γ = set of all ordinary elements of a set α = set of all multiples that do not belong to themselves that belong to α = an "existing part" of α
  (1) So γ is included in α, thus it belongs to powerset of α
  (2) But γ does not belong to α itself
    (A) If γ did belong to α
      (I) γ is ordinary, that is, ~ (γ ∈ γ), and thus belongs to ordinary subset of α
      (II) But ordinary subset of α is γ
      (III) And that means γ ∈ γ [γ is "evental"] which contradicts (I)
    (B) Therefore, γ does not belong to α

B) Consequences
  I) There is at least one element of power-set which is not element of initial set
  II) IOW, no multiple can unify all that it includes; inclusion exceeds belonging
  III) Subset of all ordinary elements of a set = point of excess over that set
  IV) The "immanent resources" of a presented multiple exceed capacity of the initial count-as-one; thus the second count, the metastructure, is needed

3) Void and excess: what is effect of belonging vs inclusion distinction on void as proper name of being?
  A) Two relations of void and inclusion
    I) Void is a subset of any set: it is universally included in all sets
    II) Void has a subset: the void itself
  B) First property: universal inclusion of void in all sets = errancy of void in all presentation
    I) Intuitive presentation:
      (1) no multiple can prevent the inexistent from placing itself within that multiple
      (2) void is presented everywhere in its lack [*présenté dans son manque*]
        (A) not as counted (as a belonging element)
        (B) but as included
    II) Deductive presentation: "from the false, anything follows"
    III) Formal presentation: "for all B, the void is included in B" = void is subset of any set
  C) Second property: void has a subset, the void; IOW the void includes the void as a subset
    I) Intuitively, this is strange
      (1) It looks like the void is "filled" by itself
      (2) But only belonging "fills" presentation
      (3) Inclusion only entails that everything has itself as a subset, as its "maximal" subset
    II) There is a power-set of the null-set; there is a metastructure of the void
      (1) Whatever is included in a set belongs to its power-set
      (2) So the power-set of the void is just the name of the void, not the void "itself"
      (3) This is written as $p(\emptyset) = \{\emptyset\}$
      (4) Implying that $\emptyset \in p(\emptyset)$, that is, the void belongs to the power-set of the void
    III) Precautions
      (1) The void has no elements; the name of the void, its mark $\emptyset$, "presents being in its lack"
      (2) The void does not belong to the set $\{\emptyset\}$; what belongs to this set is the proper name of the void
      (3) The excess of inclusion over belonging does not imply that belonging exceeds inclusion
      (4) For certain multiples it is true that "for all A, 'A belongs to B' implies 'A is included in B'"
      (5) This is "particularly true" of the set $\{\emptyset\}$
        (A) Its unique element, $\emptyset$
        (B) Is also one of its subsets, since $\emptyset$ is universally included in all sets

4)One, Count-as-one, Unicity and Forming-into-One
  A) We must distinguish count-as-one as operation and one as result ("fictive one-effect")
      I) The one is not (unity is not an ontological fundament); the one is result of an operation
      II) In case of null-set, count-as-one is fixing a proper name for unpresentable
          (1) (= negation of any presented multiple)
          (2) Danger here: assigning predicate of the one to suture-to-being that is the name
          (3) AST is more rigorously paradoxical: the name doesn't present anything but it is name of a multiple
  B) Unicity (uniqueness): predicate of the multiple.
      I) Belongs to same / other regime
      II) A multiple is unique in that it is other than any other
      III) Regarding the void: the name of the void is unique.
          (1) This does not mean "the void is one"
          (2) Rather it means that thinking "several" names would make us think the being of the one
  C) Forming-into-one
      I) Preliminaries
          (1) Count-as-one can always be applied to an already counted one-multiple
          (2) That is, any name of a set can be counted-as-one
          (3) Modality of count-as-one used to describe count-as-one applied to a one-result
      II) So set $\{\emptyset\}$ is "forming-into-one of the name" (that is,"void" as proper name of being)
      III) The "singleton": "first derived law" of AST
          (1) Via the axiom of replacement, we know that $\{\emptyset\}$ can be transformed into $\{\delta\}$
          (2) So we can "form-into-one" δ as $\{\delta\}$, which is a "singleton"
          (3) So $\{\emptyset\}$ is the "first" singleton
          (4) And we can make $\{\emptyset\}$ into another, recursive, singleton $\{\{\emptyset\}\}$
              (A) $\emptyset$ is an element of $\{\emptyset\}$
              (B) But $\{\emptyset\}$ is an element of $\{\{\emptyset\}\}$
              (C) And $\emptyset$, $\{\emptyset\}$, and $\{\{\emptyset\}\}$ are all different (via axiom of extension)
          (5) And we get the "unlimited production of new multiples" from combined effect of
              (A) Power-set axiom
              (B) Operation of forming-into-one

MEDITATION 8: THE STATE, OR METASTRUCTURE AND THE TYPOLOGY OF BEING (NORMALITY, SINGULARITY, AND EXCRESCENCE)

1)State or metastructure as protection against the "danger of the void"
  A) Danger of the void
      I) The void qua name of inconsistency w/in situation cannot be presented
      II) This results in a "situational anxiety" of the void; void must be warded off
      III) Must prohibit "catastrophe of presentation" = situation's encounter w/ its own void
  B) The count escapes the count: the "there is Oneness" reveals its operationality
      I) It's possible structure itself could be point where void is given
      II) So structure as count must itself be counted; there must be a "metastructure"
  C) The necessity of metastructure can be derived from observation:
      I) Although the being of presentation is inconsistent multiplicity
      II) Yet presentation is never chaotic; the void is never presented
  D) Metastructure guarantees that gap btw consistent / inconsistent multiple is null in situation
      I) This is a "fictionalizing" of the count

        II)   Which insures that "pure operational transparency" of the count is fixed w/in the one

2)Metaphorical affinity w/ politics whereby metastructure = "state of the situation"
- A) State of situation doesn't just re-count the terms of a situation
- B) Instead it counts the parts of a situation
  - I) Parts are "sub-multiples"
  - II) We can understand this w/ set theory
    - (1) Consistent multiplicity = result of first count = element belonging to a situation
    - (2) Sub-multiples = result of metastructure qua second count = part included in situation

3)Employing the ontological theorem of the point of excess
- A) Inclusion exceeds belonging; sub-multiples exceed terms; parts exceed elements
- B) Thus there are included parts that cannot be counted by the first count as terms
  - I) Thus they do not exist in the situation (= result of first count)
  - II) Thus inexistent part is "place in which the void may receive the latent form of being"
    - (1) Inexistent part is "possible support" of "the one is not" being recognized in the situation
    - (2) But that would be the "ruin of presentation":
      - (A) In the situation, ones are ontological fundaments
      - (B) But we know this is just a fiction
        - (I) The one is not
        - (II) The one is an operation producing a fictive unity of the situation

4)So the metastructure must step in here, so that "what is included in a situation belongs to its state"
- A) As a final result, the first count is counted by the state
- B) Thus there is the "total part" as complete set of everything counted in original situation
- C) So the state is a "riposte" to the void

5)Immanence and transcendence of state
- A) State of situation is structure transcendent / separate from first structure of situation
- B) But it is always the state of a situation; it is attached

6)Typology of donation of being: difference btw presentation and representation
- A) Normal = term that is both presented and represented (both belongs and is included)
- B) Singular = term which is presented but not represented (belongs but cannot be included)
  - I) Cannot be re-secured by the state
  - II) It exists, but its existence cannot be directly verified by the state
- C) Excrescence = term which is represented but not presented (included but do not belong)
  - I) A one of the state that doesn't belong to the initial situation
  - II) Existent of the state that in-exists in the initial situation
- D) [cf. p 125F / 108E: the void is neither presented nor represented]

7)Resulting requirements for situation of ontology
- A) Theory of presentation must provide theory of the state; i.e., distinguish belonging / inclusion
- B) But this doesn't mean two axiom systems, one for presentation and one for the state
- C) IOW, ontology as a situation cannot have its own excrescences
  - I) You can't have representation w/o presentation
  - II) Because all ontology does is presentation of presentation
- D) Thus the state of ontology's situation is inseparable / inexistent
- E) And thus the state's anti-void functions are not guaranteed for ontology
- F) The void is the sub-set par excellence; it is always included

8)Splitting situation and state of situation
- A) Situation: presentation, count-as-one, structure, belonging, element
- B) State: representation, count of count, metastructure, inclusion, subset / part

MEDITATION 9: THE STATE OF THE HISTORICAL-SOCIAL SITUATION

1) Marxist thought
    A) State deals with parts (classes), not terms (citizens)
    B) It's thus less related to social bond than to un-binding or internal oppositions
2) Badiou's take on Marxist theory of the State / ruling class
    A) The State works by forming-one out of parts of a situation
    B) The State works on an already structured situation as its necessary metastructure
        I) There is Oneness not in the immediacy of society but in set of subsets
        II) This is what is meant by "State of the ruling class"
            (1) State is not an "instrument" possessed by ruling class, but "ruling class" means the "uniformity of effect" produced by metastructure
            (2) State always re-presents what has already been presented
                (A) State is not defined for Marxists in "statist" (governmental) form
                (B) But in economic and social terms
3) Attachment and separation of the State from historical-social presentation
    A) State is tied to presentation bcs parts are multiples of already counted multiples
        I) The state cannot bring forth a null-term whose elements are absent from the situation
        II) So the state is purely administrative; this is more essential than State coercion
    B) State is necessarily a separate apparatus
        I) Parts of society exceed the state (inclusion cannot be reduced to belonging)
        II) State is thus subject to theorem of point of excess
4)The State's coercive function
    A) States don't deal w/ individuals as structured by situation
        I) As "themselves"
        II) As proper name of an infinite multiple
    B) Rather the individual is treated as a subset, as the singleton of himself
        I) As an "indifferent figure of unicity," the forming-into-one of the name
        II) So you as "voter" is not "you" in your self, but you as represented by the State as one voter
    C) This treating as a singleton is the state's coercive function
        I) That is, the state doesn't treat you as belonging to society
        II) But only as included in society
        III) IOW, State doesn't care about your life, your self, but only you as citizen, as administered
5)Fatal ambiguity of Marxist analysis (Engels)
    A) Engels thinks the State is itself an excrescence
        I) So representation (State) can be done away with
        II) In favor of universal simple presentation (communist society)
    B) Source of Engels' ambivalence
        I) Separation of state not from simple existence of parts but from their conflict
        II) Hence w/o the state you would have permanent civil war
    C) State is not founded on social bond, but on prohibition of un-binding
        I) So separation of state is due to danger of inconsistency
        II) We do in fact see state's call out the riot troops when an inconsistent crowd arrives
    D) But Engels is really saying that
        I) Bourgeoisie is a normal term (presented and represented)
        II) Proletariat is a singular term (presented but not represented)
        III) State apparatus is an excrescence (represented but not presented)

E) Engels: real problem is different regimes of presentation btw bourgeoisie and proletariat
  I) Reduces void to non-representation of proletariat, instead of its being unpresentability
  II) Reduces separate count of parts by state to non-universality of bourgeois interests
  III) Reduces machinery of count-as-one to an excrescence (rather than as necessary)

6)Consequences
  A) For Engels, politics is an assault on the State (excrescence is intolerable)
  B) For Badiou, the State as such, as necessity of metastructure, cannot be destroyed
    I) So it's not antagonism of classes at origin of State (void and excess are not antagonistic)
    II) But politics = capacity to establish relation to both void and excess different from the relation established by the State
      (1) So the militant is not a warrior against the State
      (2) But a "patient watchman of the void instructed by the event"
        (A) In a truth procedure militants construct means to be faithful to proper name
        (B) They will be able retroactively to give to the void

MEDITATION 10: SPINOZA

1) Introduction
  A) Spinoza's circular logic
    I) A thing is singular rather than a composition (a "multiple individual") if its elements contribute to a unique effect
      (1) Its multiplicity is unified by its causal effects
      (2) IOW, structure = causality
    II) But you need a criterion of unicity to identify such unique effects
      (1) What appears as a "unique effect" is itself a complex of individuals
      (2) To identify this unique effect as unique I have to look to ITS effects, and so on
    III) So you have an "infinite oscillation" btw
      (1) Inconsistent individuals ("multiple individual")
      (2) Consistent singular things
  B) "Deconstructing" Spinoza
    I) Spinoza's intention: assure structure by metastructure (= God / Substance / Nature)
      (1) He wants to in-distinguish belonging and inclusion
      (2) He wants to foreclose the void
    II) Spinoza's text ("unconscious awareness of his task")
      (1) The void is named "infinite mode"
      (2) This is the point where one can no longer avoid supposition of a Subject
2) Badiou's demonstration
  A) Essential identity of belonging and inclusion evident in definition of singular thing
    I) Things are modes of God; the "in" of belonging is universal
      (1) Any combination of things is just another mode of God
      (2) IOW, God is the state of the situation and he saturates presentation
        (A) Things are presented as one-multiples (elements of situations): belonging
        (B) But are always able to be represented as modes of God (as "parts"): inclusion
    II) Identity and difference: singular divine substance and infinity of attributes
      (1) God's unity allows an infinity of intellectually separable situations ("attributes")
      (2) Statist excess unifies presentative immediacy
        (A) Although humans belong to two separable situations (thought and extension)
        (B) They are unified bcs state of those situations is the same (both attributes of God)

III) Foreclosure of the void follows from the preceding
    (1) The void cannot belong to a situation; it is inexistent / unpresented
        (A) It would have to be counted-as-one, but the operator of the count is causality
        (B) [JP: cf. the connection with Aristotle: for Spinoza the void is "not given in Nature"]
    (2) The void cannot be included in a situation either
        (A) It would have to be counted by the metastructure
        (B) But that too is causality, qua "immanent production of divine substance"
            (I) [JP: natural events are God's way of modifying himself]
IV) Overview of failure of foreclosure of the void; irreducible "errancy"
    (1) Singular things are essentially finite but God is infinite cause
    (2) Infinity thus designates "statist excess" over presentation (of singular finite things)
    (3) Void (as foundation of excess) = "errancy of incommensurability btw finite and infinite"
V) Detailed analysis of Spinoza's failure
    (1) Badiou's account
        (A) Nothing is given beyond substance and modes; attributes are not given
        (B) Substance / modes couple doesn't coincide with infinite / finite
        (C) So we must think "infinite modes"
    (2) Spinoza's deductive procedure
        (A) Immediate infinite mode = everything following from God's attributes
        (B) Mediate infinite mode = everything following from an infinite mode
        (C) Everything following from a finite / singular thing is finite
    (3) Badiou's analysis:
        (A) Excess of state / infinite substantial origin of causality is hidden in presentation
            (I) Rift btw finite and infinite does not appear in the finite
            (II) Chain of infinite modes is disconnected from presentation of finite things
        (B) How then do infinite modes exist?
            (I) Spinoza says very little about them and what he does say is not part of deductive argument of the Ethics
            (II) When he does mention them he tends to present them as totalities
                1. Nature as "infinite immobile totality of singular moving things"
                2. Divine Understanding as "infinite totality of particular minds"
            (III) But "totality" via addition ≠ divine substantial unity
        (C) You cannot establish existence of infinite modes by experience or definition
        (D) Spinoza's impasse
            (I) Either infinite modes exist but are inaccessible to thought and experience
                1. There is an "underworld of infinite things" that is unpresentable
                2. Thus void for us in our situations
            (II) Or they do not exist
                1. This directly creates a void
                2. Bcs causality as principle of presentation relies on inexistent infinite modes
        (E) "Infinite mode" as "pure name"
            (I) Its referent is "eclipsed"
            (II) It is cited only as needed in proof
                1. Cancelled from all finite experience
                2. But it is precisely the foundation of the unity of that experience
3) Conclusion
    A) Natural or ordinary multiplicities
        I) Definition of "natural" = max equilibrium of belonging / inclusion

- (1) All terms are normal (cf Med 8) (= represented in place of presentation)
- (2) So for Spinoza, every term is natural (*Deus, sive Natura*)
- II) Price to pay for such foundation
  - (1) You have to name void by term w/o referent ("infinite mode")
  - (2) This "installs errancy in the deductive chain"
- B) "Great lesson of Spinoza"
  - I) You can never pin down the void; it will always wander around in "errancy"
  - II) This is what happens with the "necessary but inexistent" infinite mode