Matter and Memory Chapter 2: “On the Recognition of Images”
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I) Intro: role of body leads to three hypotheses [81 / 77]
  A) Role of body as conductor
    1) Receives movements
    2) Transmits them to motor mechanisms
  B) Three hypotheses
    1) Past survives in two forms / memory functions in two ways
      (a) Motor mechanisms / automatic triggering of mechanism
      (b) Independent recollections / effort of mind to find useful representations
    2) Recognition of a present object has two forms
      (a) The two forms:
        (i) Effected by movements when coming from object
        (ii) Effected by representations when coming from subject
      (b) Discussion of temporality of body
        (i) At any one moment, body is conductor of movements
        (ii) In flow of time, body is
          (i) “ever advancing boundary btw future and past, as a pointed end, which our past is continually driving forward into our future”
          (ii) “always situated at the very point where my past expires in a deed”
    3) We pass by imperceptible stages from temporally organized recollections to movements indicating possible action in space. Brain lesions affect movements, not actions.

II) The two forms of memory (procedural and episodic) [83 / 79]
  A) First statement of the distinction: with regard to habit [83 / 79]
    1) Procedural-memory: having learnt a lesson by heart: habit
      (a) Repetition of same effort
      (b) Decomposition / re-composition of whole action
      (c) Stored up in a triggered mechanism
    2) Episodic memory: singular memory of each training session: non-habitual
      (a) Imprinted all at once in memory as different from other sessions
      (b) Event-character; dated; unable to be repeated
      (c) Later recalls will not affect its nature
  B) Focusing on time shows difference in kind btw two forms [84 / 80]
    1) We might at first see only difference in degree
    2) But if we focus on time, we see a difference in kind
      (a) Episodic memory is a representation and can have varying duration
      (b) Procedural memory is an action and requires a definite time to play out
        (i) No mark of the past
        (ii) Belongs to present
  C) Second statement of the distinction: with regard to past and present [86 / 81]
    1) Episodic memory stores up past [in itself] w/o regard to present utility
    2) Procedural memory stores up past in modified body w/ view to utility
      (a) Doesn’t represent past but acts it

(b) Prolongs useful effect of bygone images into present moment

D) Relation of the two forms of memory with regard to utility [87 / 82]
1) Procedural memory can replace and be mistaken for episodic bcs of utility of procedural memory qua bodily mechanism
2) Episodic memory is *spontaneous*; procedural is *automatic*
3) Repetition does not convert episodic into procedural
(a) It only organizes the movements involved in episodes to create habits
(b) Thus procedural memory is only habit interpreted by memory; it's not really a form of memory at all
4) Adaption to life is the aim of procedural memory / habit
(a) Episodic memory can drift to dreams
(b) But cness selects past images that are useful to current situation
5) Thus habit inhibits image-memory or at least filters out non-useful images
6) Dream quality of image memory allows cness to reach them by *effort*
(a) So we need not wait for accidental repetition of a situation
(b) Thus we can actively construct our own habits by *training*
7) Hypothesis of three relations
(a) Exaltation of image memory when sensorimotor equilibrium is disturbed
(b) Inhibition of non-useful image memory in normal state
(c) In training, a "latent intervention" of image memory

E) Mutual support of two forms of memory in training [91 / 86]
1) Evidence from pathological cases shows "complex mechanisms, subtle enough to imitate intelligence, can work by themselves"
2) During training, we have a vague / evanescent sense of whole to be made
3) This spontaneous recollection vanishes with voluntary memory

F) Summary: 2 pure forms: procedural/habit vs episodic/spontaneous memory

G) Critique of philosophical reliance on impure or mixed forms of memory [95 / 88]
1) Mixing of localized image and cerebral mechanism leads to hypothesis of recollections stored in brain
2) Since they think repetition of episodic images ends in motor habit tied to brain mechanism, they assume brain is an organ of representation generating images
3) We have to instead distinguish different kinds of memory in mixed states

III) Recognition in general: memory-images and movements [96 / 90]

A) Associative theory of recognition [96 / 90]
1) First statement:
(a) Recognition = association of present perception with contextual images formerly given w/ it
(b) Objection: but this implies recognition of resemblance of former image w/ present image (so you have presupposed what you're trying to explain)
2) Restatement:
(a) Recognition = blending of perception and memory
(b) Objection:
(i) Often recollection (memory) only comes after recognition (perception of resemblance)
(ii) This can only be explained by brain traces, w/ obscure mechanism

(c) Facts of pathology bear out B's objection

B) Bergson's theory of recognition: between perception and mechanism [100 / 92]
1) In intermediate state perception is followed by "impending" mechanism
2) Thus recognition is founded on cness of organized motor reaction
3) Thesis: no perception not prolonged into movement
4) "we commonly act our recognition before we think it"

C) Interlude / forecast of Ch 3: survival of the past in itself [103 / 95]
1) This memory ("pure memory") awaits disruption of sensorimotor link
2) Need effort to disengage from present to find dated/personal memory-image
3) Movement (done / nascent) prepare choice of image or mark out area of past
4) Movement both hinders and encourages image-memory
(a) In principle, present utility discourages conscious memory-images
(b) But memory-images resembling present perception can slip in

D) Bergson's theory explains two kinds of psychic blindness [104 / 96]
1) Statement of the two types
(a) Memory image can no longer reappear
(b) Disruption of link of motor habits and perception
(i) Facts supporting this reading
(i) Loss of sense of direction
(ii) Manner of drawing
2) Conclusion as to primary condition of recognition
(a) Habit of distinguishing articulations of perceived object
(b) That is, completing perception by a motor tendency

E) Transition to last section: active recognition [107 / 98]
1) Automatic recognition takes us away from object (to useful habits)
2) Attentive recognition brings us back to object to dwell on striking features
(a) Analogous images to present perception will come easily
(b) But they have to give up much of their detail to do so

IV) Gradual passage of memories to movements: recognition and attention [107 / 99]

A) Question of relation of perception and memory [107 / 99]
1) Statement of the question:
(a) Does perception determine memory?
(b) Or do memories spontaneously go to meet perception?
2) Presupposition of the question: relation of brain and memory
(a) If brain action causes image generation
(i) Then memory is function of brain
(ii) And brain lesions would destroy memory storage
(b) If brain action is only motor adaption
(i) Then memory is independent of brain
(ii) And brain lesions would only affect motor mechanisms
(i) Hinder body from taking attitude that would call back image
(ii) Hinder body from acting and hence stop actualization of image

B) Cyclical relation of perception, attention and memory [108 / 100]
1) Attention
(a) Intellectualist definitions
(b) Bergson: attention = adaptation of body

2) Memory: doubles present perception with images in cyclical process
   (a) Attention is like “telegraph clerk”
   (b) Analysis by attention via series of attempts at synthesis (finding resemblance of memory-image and perception)
3) Perception
   (a) Is not just impressions
   (b) But attentive perception involves reflection
      (i) Projection outside ourselves of an actively created image
      (ii) Identical with or similar to object on which it comes to mold itself
      (iii) Mixture of memory and perception in actual life
      (iv) Closed circle: perception-image and memory-image running alongside

C) Restatement to emphasize cyclical nature [113 / 103]
1) Two conceptions of mind
   (a) Perception / memory is not a linear / mechanical process
   (b) But a circuit, a state of mutual tension: “solidarity” of mind and object
2) Diagram of circuits
   (a) Whole of memory in each circuit, but at different degrees of tension
   (b) Same psychical life is repeated at different stages / stories [*étages*]
      (i) Personal memories at last and largest stage [cf. cone image in Ch3]
      (ii) Less personal / more general forms of those recollections make up tighter / more contracted stages, able to fit into present perception
      (iii) In this way, memory attains greater practical importance
         (i) Personal memories are like dream images
         (ii) Acting shrinks these memories to a knife’s edge, fit into present
            1. Perception as motor mechanisms provide a sketch of object
            2. Into which memory-images fit, providing color and detail

D) Confirmation of hypothesis by examination of facts [117 / 107]
1) Expected results:
   (a) Memory pathology not due to destruction of brain-stored memory
   (b) Rather, by two causes
      (i) Sometime body cannot adopt attitude leading to motor mechanism
      (ii) Sometimes memories cannot become actual
2) Confirmation by pathology: two kinds of psychic / word deafness or blindness
3) Limitation to example of language recognition, which depends on
   (a) An automatic sensorimotor process: “motor diagram” [*schème moteur*]
   (b) An active / excentric projection of memory-images