

# Speech and Phenomena – Chapter 4 “Meaning and Representation”

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[protevi@lsu.edu](mailto:protevi@lsu.edu) / [http://www.protevi.com/john/DH/PDF/SpeechAndPhenomena\(chap4\).pdf](http://www.protevi.com/john/DH/PDF/SpeechAndPhenomena(chap4).pdf)

## I. Introduction [48-49]

A. recap: expression is not communication [indication]

B. two arguments about inner monologue

1. no communication, only representation and imagination

2. no need to communicate, because of self-presence of subject

C. status of representation in language

1. general sense of *Vorstellung*

2. re-presentation

3. place holder

## II. the first argument [49-57]: imagination and representation

A. EH wants to apply distinction between reality and rep. to language

1. effective communication [indication] vs "represented" communication

2. to reach inner monologue as pure rep., a fiction [i.e., a representation] is needed

a. this is imaginary representation

b. = neutralizing representation

B. can these distinctions be applied to language?

1. we would have to suppose rep. is not essential to communication

2. but it is impossible to rigorously distinguish rep. [imagined expression] and reality [effective indicative communication], bcs. all communication, as signitive, is repetitive, and hence representative

3. thus representation is on both sides of the distinction btw indicative communication and imagined expression

C. EH gives us motives to take opposite position

1. RE: B.1.: representation is essential to communication: effective use of signs implies structure of repetition [= representation]

2. here JD is showing ideality of external, empirical communication

a. sign is never an "event"

b. must be formally recognizable across empirical iterations

c. must remain the "same"

d. must be repeatable as such

e. this formal identity is ideal, which implies three forms of rep.

(1) *Vorstellung* = locus of ideality in general [conceptuality]

(2) *Vergegen.* = possibility of repetition in general

(3) *Repräsentation* = placeholder. each instance takes place of:

(a) signified

(b) ideal form

3. since representation = signification, effective discourse, as signitive, is representative

D. but EH wants to have only expression be representative, not indication

1. but indication is indeed representative, since it is made possible by repetition

2. if [all] discourse is representative, distinction btw effective [indicative] and merely represented [expressive] discourse is suspect

a. whether the represented discourse is expressive or communicative

b. bcs. of repetitive [that is, representative] nature of signs, distinction of effective and imaginary is contaminated

c. bcs. founding distinction of presence and repetition is also contaminated

E. signs, presence and the closure of metaphysics [51]

F. EH's descriptive breakthrough: presence derived from repetition [52b-53a]

1. ideality as structure of discourse

- a. sensible form of signifier
- b. signified = intended sense = *Bedeutung*
- c. sometimes, object itself [e.g., Pythagorean theorem]
- 2. ideality depends on possibility of acts of repetition
- 3. being = ideality = repetition
- G. EH's thematic metaphysical investment: being as ideality "paradoxically one" w/ being as presence [53b-54a]

- 1. pure ideality
  - a. = ideal object present before act of repetition
    - (1) *Vor-stellung* = presence before act of intuition
  - b. temporality founded on LP [now as source point]
    - (1) ensures purity of ideality
    - (2) that is, openness for infinite repeatability of same
- 2. principle of principles
  - a. form of all experience is the present
    - (1) last hiding spot of being as presence
    - (2) relation to such presence is how I transgress empiricity
      - (a) especially my own empiricity [=mortality]
      - (b) thus presence as repeatable, universal form of experience
        - i) is my relation to my own death
        - ii) so T life is relation to empirical death
        - iii) sign [=repetition = ideality = form of LP] = death

H. the relation [life/death]: death and the subject [54b-55a]

- 1. relation to death constitutes subjectivity
- 2. that is, possibility of my absence, which reveals repeatable form of the LP, is my relation to T ego, seat of capabilities of constituting acts [= ability to synthesize temporality so all acts have same form--any possible act, by anyone, any "I," at any time]
- 3. some paradoxes:
  - a. thus "I am" = "I am mortal"
  - b. and "I am immortal" is impossible
  - c. "I am who am" is saying of a mortal
- 4. so seeing T ego as *res cogitans*, as immortal, enduring presence, conceals signs/death, the very conditions of that presence

I. EH has confused effacement of signs w/ reduction of imagination [55b]

- 1. EH's ambiguous relation to the traditional notion of imagination
  - a. profoundly renewed question of the imagination
  - b. yet imagination is "neutralizing" re-presentation
    - (1) both image and memory are re-presentations [of a presence]
    - (2) imagination modifies in neutralizing it, a positional re-presentation, i.e., memory
      - (a) NB: "positional" = objectifying
      - (b) image has then reference to primary presentation
        - i) perception
        - ii) positing of existence
- 2. pure ideality via neutralization [= phen. reduction] is not fiction
- 3. remark on Husserl and Hume: contamination of powers of repetition
  - a. pure repetition opening ideality
  - b. imaginative reproduction of empirical perception

J. four disconcerting points about the 1st *LI* [kettle logic reveals desire]

- 1. pure expressions are imaginative representations
- 2. communications in monologue are fictions
  - a. expression thus seem to be effective [=non-fictional]

- b.but expression is supposed to be non-effective
- 3.communication uses same [ideal] words as does expression
  - a.yet EH wants to keep ideality for expression
  - b.thus it seems effectiveness is to expression as body to soul
- 4.in inner monologue, some discourse
  - a.is effectively representative
    - (1)= expressions
    - (2)purely objective, theoretical language
  - b.while some is fictional
    - (1)[= not really representative,
    - (2)but communicative]
- K.but if signs are repetitive, then fiction v effective signs is contaminated [56f-57a]
  - 1.repetition destroys presence/reality vs re-presentation/fiction
  - 2.= signs are wrought by fiction
  - 3.no sure criterion to distinguish inner vs outer language
  - 4.or in inner language, between effective and fictitious
    - a.but this is needed for EH to reduce indication from expression
- L.sign demonstration holds for acts of the subject; this leads to:
- III.the second argument [57-59 {and Ch.5}]
  - A.bcs of repetitive signs, distinction of effective vs. represented speech is contaminated [bcs. repetition erodes distinction of reality vs fiction, or primary vs secondary]
    - 1.consequences:
      - a.subject cannot speak [effectively] w/o representation of speech
      - b.subject cannot represent w/o effectiveness
    - 2.conclusion: primordial unity of speech and rep. of speech
      - a.speech represents itself; it is its representation
      - b.speech is the representation of itself
  - B.EH seems to allow simple exteriority of effectiveness and representation of the subject
    - 1.thinking you are communicating w/ yourself internally is falsity
    - 2.if this is the case--a false cness--then truth seems to be uncons.
      - a.but this can't be, bcs. cness is self-presence of living
      - b.experience is thus simple and truthful, since self-present
    - 3.thus illusion of inner communication floats on surface of experience as secondary cness
  - C.anticipation of EH's desired reduction of expression to sense:
    - 1. language [and representation of lang] is addition to self-present conscious experience
    - 2.or at least an experience [sense as object held for vision] that reflects its own presence in silence [in voice {"that keeps silence"}]
    - 3.signs are thus foreign to presence of intuition/perception
  - D.representation of indication is false bcs useless, needless, superfluous
    - 1.this uselessness is nonalterity of self-presence
    - 2.presence
      - a.enigma of proximity to self
      - b.temporal essence of this proximity
        - (1)self-presence must be produced in present as now
        - (2)indivisible blink of the eye