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Speech and Phenomena
Chapter I: "Sign and Signs"
I.Preliminary distinction: "sign" = Zeichen [17-18b]
A.two components
1.expression = Ausdruck
= bedeutsam Zeichen ["meaningful sign"]
2.indication = Anzeichen
a.has no expression of Sinn or Bedeutung
b. bedeutsamlos Zeichen
B.tie of Ausdruck/expression [has Bedeutung] to Rede
[speech]
1.Ausdruck is purely linguistic
2.bedeuten = "mean" = want to say = vouloir-dire
a.= relation to possible
object
b.= pure logicality [= grammar
for presentation of an object]
(1) widersinnig = countersense
(a)grammar for possible object
(b)but no factual object
i)empirical [mountain of gold]
ii)a priori [square circle]
(2) sinnlos = nonsense ["abracadabra" "green is or"]
II.EH vs Frege [18c-20a]
A.Frege:
1. Sinn = meaning
= concept
2. Bedeutung = referent
B. Husserl:
1.in the LI: no distinction
between Sinn and Bedeutung
2.in Ideas I [124]:
a.meaning = Bedeutung = ideal content of verbal expression
b.sense = Sinn = whole noematic sphere [incl nonexpression]
(1) noema = intentional correlate
(2)pre-expressive stratum of lived experience
(3)able to receive expression and meaning
(a)via passage to infinite as idealization
(b)as reflected in phenomenologically reduced voice
III.functional, not substantial distinction btw expression/indication
[20b-21]
A.depends on intentional experience that animates
the sign
B.entanglement/interweaving = Verflechtung
= in communicative speech
1.each factual expression
is communicative
2. de facto necessary
interweaving cannot eliminate de jure distinction
a.this distinction is the ground of phenomenology
b.does not exist prior to language;
(1) de facto: discovered only in language
(2) de jure: depends on distinction btw indication/expression
C.expression is caught up in indication, but not
vice versa
1.this tempts us to make
indication the genus
a.so that speech is a gesture
b.essence of speech belongs to signification/indication
2. Husserl contests this
possible interpretation
a.must isolate a phenomenological situation of pure expression
b.monological voice of solitary mental life
IV.Economy of exteriority [22a]
A.suspension of a certain outside reveals space
of intuition of object
B.transcendental phenomenological idealism
1.describes:
a.objectivity of object
b.presence of present
c.objectivity in presence
2.from standpoint of intereriority
= self-proximity
a.BUT, not a simple inside
b.rather, relation to a beyond and exteriority in general
(1)=spacing
(2)and through spacing, empiricity, indication, etc
V.Question of sign in general [23b-26]
A.dogmatic haste in repressing this question
1.which he must presuppose
in distinguishing two types of signs
a.must have a precomprehension of the essence of "sign"
b.sign in general must be a form, not a genus
2.EH's evasion of the question
a.sign for something
b.structure of substitution or reference [Zeigen in general]
(1)distinction:
(a)expressive reference = Hinzeigen
(b)indicative reference = Anzeigen
(2) Zeigen as root of this distinction is root of interweaving
(3)logic as theme predisposes EH to expression/ Hinzeigen
(a) telos intervening in eidos
B.critical vigilance in deferring the question
1.perhaps two irreducible
concepts improperly bound under same name
2.form of question "what
is" in "what is sign in general"
a.putting signification under ontology
(1)subjection of sign to truth
(2)language to being
(3)speech to thought
(4)writing to speech
b.what if sign constituted truth/essence/being?
c.sign as structure of an intentional movement a thing
C.reversing the traditional procedure
1.EH attentive to language
producing ideal objectivity [ITOG]
2.this is not a simple move
a.two motifs of phenomenology
(1)reduction of naive ontology
(a)=return to active constitution of sense
(b)=activity of a life producing truth through signs
(2)confirming classical metaphysics of presence
(a)registration of sense in intuition preserved in voice
(b)point-source of LP